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In recent decades the more industrialized, democratic societies have experienced a number of 
dramatic changes in socio-demographic behavior. More di ectly, unprecedented shifts in family 
formation such as increased cohabitation, divorce, and non-marital fertility, a rising age at first 
childbirth and first marriage, and fertility declines too well-below population replacement levels, all 
these features were described as a ‘Second Demographic Transition’ by Dirk Van De Kaa and Ron 
Lesthaeghe.  
In present research the author investigates the change of fertility development in selected 
countries, which include western countries of Sweden and the United States of America and post-
socialist countries such as the Russian Federation, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan 
and the Republic of Latvia. The countries are distingu shed by two main groups of western and 
post-socialist countries in order to describe and point out the main characteristics of the differences 
in the fertility development among two groups. 
Sweden as a leader in the development of the features of the ‘Second Demographic 
Transition’ and to some extent slightly later the USA started important changes in the 1960s while 
the post-socialist countries experienced the radical ch nge in socio-economic settings after the 
collapse of socialism. From the mid-1960s of the 20th century, the consequences of social and 
economic developments in the West led to an increase in the importance of factors (increased 
female labor force participation, longer education, rising unemployment, etc.) conductive to low 
fertility rates in many Western European and North America countries. In contrast, during the same 
period of societal conditions in the state socialist authoritarian and centrally planned regimes had 
developed an environment that was comparatively favorable for early and relatively high rates of 
childbearing (Frejka, 2008).  
Western fertility trends occurred in the 1960s were characterized by the dramatic 
transformation of family patterns towards less committed and more fragile couple relationships, by 
the later and less likely transition to parenthood, and by the sharp reduction of higher-order births 
currently taking place in Europe and European-origin populations (Lesthaeghe, 1995).  
When the state socialist regimes collapsed in Central and Eastern Europe, the entire societal 
and institutional system was transformed. Incentives and constraints related to childbearing 
suddenly equally ended and were replaced within a period of a few years by a new social, economic 
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and welfare system that is based on the principles as institutional systems in western societies. 
During the 1990s and the early 21st century, young people of prime childbearing age adjusted to 
these new conditions, which were mirrored by changes in family formation, partnership 
relationships and patterns of childbearing (Frejka, 2008).  
Countries investigated in the thesis (Czech Republic, Russian Federation and Republic of 
Latvia) are the post-socialist countries and represent the Central and Eastern Europe. The Republic 
of Kazakhstan as a special country that geographically belongs to Europe and Asia presents the 
form of demographic development in Central Asia.  
Sweden is a well-known as the forerunner of the ‘Second Demographic Transition’. The 
United States stands for western demographic behavior experiencing some special features (higher 
teenage fertility, important race disparities and a important share of immigrants). 
Western fertility trends up to the second half of the 20th century were experienced by the 
post-socialist countries after the collapse of state socialist regime. Some circumstances of the 
western fertility patterns from 1960s through 1990s were similar to what happened in post-socialist 
countries in the 1990s, therefore the analysis of western developments is justified and relevant 
because analogous conditions emerged in post-socialist countries after the transformation from 
socialist planning economy to the market economy of the capitalist form of management.   
An increase in fertility in western countries in the post-war period up to the beginning of 
the 1960s (baby-boom) was due to realization of desired childbearing (including compensation 
factor) along with sustainable economic development the modern welfare system established. As a 
result many costs of children were fully or partly covered by the state, thus lowering costs of 
childbearing that became an important factor in sustaining the baby-boom through 1950s and into 
the early 1960s. Fertility decline occurred in 1960s and 1970s and the persisting sub-replacement 
fertility of the 1980s and 1990s were accompanied by a number of interacting factors. According to 
Frejka the postponement of marriages and births from the 1960s was due to a) an unprecedented, 
increasing need for large proportions of the population to acquire more than a basic education; b) 
high and increasing labor force participation rates of women; c) increasing roles and responsibilities 
of women.  
In the latter decades of the 20th century the conditions for childbearing became more 
difficult in the West. It was not easy to find employment and to establish a household. At the same 
time the spread of modern reliable means of contraception, free access to safe and legal induced 
abortions, substantial changes in socio-cultural values, norms and attitudes concerning family 
formation and childbearing, as well as relatively weak family policy were significant in generating 
the fertility levels and trends of the late 20th century (Frejka, 2008). These latter factors observed in 
western countries were to some extent similar to those that occurred in the post-socialist countries 
in the 1990s after the collapse of state socialist regime.  
Fertility developments in selected countries (Czech Republic, Russian Federation, Republic 
of Kazakhstan, Republic of Latvia, Sweden, and USA) occurred under different socio-economic 
conditions, however changing over time. On the other hand, they have recently started the process 
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towards convergence in economic settings (including changes in cultural norms and values). The 
goal of the research is to investigate the differentiation of fertility development and the 
circumstances impacted on it during 1999 – 2007 period in above listed six countries.  
The main differences and similarities in recent fertility development will be addressed 
through detailed analysis of fertility and conditions for childbearing. To implement the goal of the 
research the following objectives were set: 
to describe the basic stages of fertility development in the past; 
to analyze changes in overall fertility and fertility by age structure and birth order; 
to identify cross country differentials; 
to analyze changes in family composition; 
to investigate extramarital fertility; 
to identify cross country differences in extramarital fertility development. 
Additionally in order to get the results from the research the following hypotheses will be 
tested: 
1. Changes in the value of total fertility rate in selected countries are the impact of 
improvement in socio-economic conditions for indiviuals; 
2. Delayed childbearing started first in western societies is influenced by transformation in 
social values, especially in child and family values. Increasing the mean age of mothers at 1st child 
birth has become a normal trend observed in selected countries. In addition, rose in the mean age at 
marriage influenced on marital fertility that was significant in overall fertility development; 
3. The proportion of extramarital live births had not a considerable impact on changes in 
overall fertility. An increase in number of children born out-of wedlock is related to the increase in 
the number of single mothers and cohabitating couples; 
4. Fertility trends occurred in the societies of western countries are to some extent repeated 
in the post-socialist countries. Convergence in changes of socio-economic conditions and cultural 
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1. THEORETICAL PART  
1.1 Overview of literature 
The issues on fertility behavior of women, including i creasing the mean age of mothers at first 
birth, extramarital births and transformation of family values are the main topics for discussion and 
research among not only demographers, but also among p liticians and civilians planning their 
future development.  
During the research the significant amount of litera u e and sources are used. Theoretical 
background on the topic of the research was based on several works of the demographers and other 
scientists. For example, the recent decline in fertility in industrialized and less developed countries 
described in Watkins’s paper ‘The fertility transition: Europe and the Third World Compared’ 
(Watkins, 1987); Kohler, Billari and Ortega’s research ‘Low Fertility in Europe: Causes, 
Implications and Policy Options’ (Kohler, Billari and Ortega, 2006); Jesus and Remo’s article 
‘Patterns in the delay and recovery of fertility in Europe’ (Jesus and Remo, 2007) and Frejka’s 
paper ‘Determinants of family formation and childbearing during the societal transition in Central 
and Eastern Europe’ (Frejka, 2008). 
The issue on women social position are clearly presented in Hilgeman and Butts’s article 
‘Family Policy, Women’s Employment, and Below-Replacement Fertility in Developed Countries: 
A Hierarchical Bayesian Approach’ (Hilgeman and Butts, 2004); Bernhardt’s article ‘Fertility and 
Employment’ (Bernhardt, 1993); McDonald’s papers ‘Gender Equity in Theories of Fertility 
Transition. Population and Development Review’ and ‘Gender Equity, Social Institutions and the 
Future of Fertility’ (McDonald, 2000). 
Additionally, the findings of Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa used in the research too, including 
Van de Kaa’s work ‘Demographic Transitions’ (Van de Kaa, 2008), Lesthaeghe’s articles 
‘Postponement and recuperation: Recent fertility trends and forecasts in six western countries’ 
(Lesthaeghe, 2001), ‘Europe’s demographic issues: fertility, household formation and replacement 
migration’, ‘The Unfolding Story of the Second Demographic Transition’ (Lesthaeghe, 2010), in 
eds Surkyn ‘New Forms of Household Formation in Central and Eastern Europe: Are they related 
to newly emerging Value Orientations?’ (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 2002), in eds Neidert ‘Second 
Demographic Transition in the United States: Exception or Textbook Example?’ (Lesthaeghe and 
Neidert, 2002). 
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The literature on political and social measures taken in selected countries has given from 
the special web pages on family issues and international organizations interested in this topic. 
Moreover, theoretical framework on family and population policy was given by the Gauthier’s 
work ‘Family policies in Industrialized countries: Is there convergence?’ (Gauthier, 2002); 
Wennemo’s research ‘Sharing the Cost of Children’ (Wennemo, 1994). In addition to these 
literatures the papers and articles of others reseach rs were taken into account.  
Fertility development in selected countries was found in different sources ranging from 
articles to the special editions in various web pages. Information and data on population history and 
fertility development of western countries were widely available in the libraries and web pages. 
Moreover, in case of Sweden, the significant amount f li erature used in the research. Particularly, 
in Hoem’s paper ‘Entry into motherhood in Sweden: the influence of economic factors on the rise 
and fall in fertility, 1986-1997’ (Hoem 2000); Andersson’s articles ‘Demographic trends in 
Sweden: An update of childbearing and nuptiality up to 2002’ (Andersson, 2004), ‘A review of 
policies and practices related to the ‘highest-low’ fertility of Sweden’ (Andersson, 2008); Olah and 
Bernhardt’s work ‘Sweden: Combining childbearing and gender equality’ (Olah and Bernhardt, 
2008). 
Population history of the United States can be found in the Klein’s book ‘A Population 
history of the United States’ (2004). In addition, there are several works and papers which contain 
deep information on fertility development, such as the Shrestha’s article ‘The changing 
demographic profile of the United States’ (Shrestha, 2006); Plotnick and Evans’s paper ‘Seven 
Decades of Nonmarital Childbearing’ (Plotnick and Evans, 2004). 
According to the topic on changing of fertility patterns in the post-socialist countries 
considerable works and researches are dedicated. The findings of Sobotka were useful in the 
description of the fertility development in post-socialist countries: Sobotka’s article ‘Ten years of 
rapid fertility changes in the European post-communist countries. Evidence and interpretation’ 
(Sobotka, 2002), ‘Re-emerging diversity: Rapid fertility changes in Central and Eastern Europe 
after the collapse of the communist regimes’ (Sobotka, 2003), in eds Stastna, Zeman, Hamplova 
and Kantarova ‘Czech Republic: A rapid transformation of fertility and family behavior after the 
collapse of state socialism’. 
At the same time a literature on the topic of fertility change in the Russian Federation is 
widely spread. For instance, Vishnevsky’s paper ‘Family, Fertility and Demographic Dynamics in 
Russia: Analysis and Forecast’ (Vishnevsky’s, 1996); Zakharov’s article ‘Russian Federation: From 
the first to the second demographic transition’ (Zakharov, 2008). 
Unfortunately the amount of literature concerning fertility development and family policy 
in the Republic of Kazakhstan and Latvia are limited. However, some researches and papers 
dedicated on changing in fertility patterns and family policy in Kazakhstan were found in 
Musabekov’s article ‘Child and Family Welfare: Trends and Indicators in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan’; Ashimbayev’s et al. research ‘Sovremennaya Demograficheskaya Situacia v 
Kazakhstane’ (Ashimbayev et al., 2004) 
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Fertility development and family policy in Latvia are described by the group of 
demographers and researchers. For instance, in Kaupuz ’s paper ‘Family policy in Estonia and 
Latvia. A Comparative review of state support to families with children’ (Kaupuza, 2005); 
Aidukaite’s research ‘Reforming family policy in the Baltic States: The views of the elites’ 
(Aidukaite, 2006). 
The literature on issue of non-marital childbearing  selected countries was found in 
several works including the papers of Keilman ‘Recent trends in Family and Household. 
Composition in Europe.’; Sprangers and Garssen ‘Non-Marital Fertility ’in the European Economic 
Area (Sprangers and Garssen, 2003); Carmen ‘Nonmarital Childbearing: Trends Reasons, and 
Public Policy Interventions’ (Carmen, 2008). 
The issue of fertility in the demographic perspective of the nations is still remaining the 
crucial factor in the development of the nation. The literature presented in the research was 
available in different sources. However, the books and researches on this topic are not widely 
spread for the post-socialist countries, especially for Kazakhstan and Latvia. The limited number of 
literature has to encourage the demographers and scienti ts (especially) to pay high attention to that; 
it might be an important factor in the process of family planning, i.e. in the building the prosperity 





















Dinmukhamed Shermakhanbetuly: Fertility patterns and trends in post-socialist countries contrasted with Sweden 
and the Unites States of America 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
16 
1.2 Theoretical background and historical overview of fertility decline 
1.2.1 Fertility decline and transition theory 
Fertility decline started first in Western Europe society. According to demographers the earliest 
sustained fertility transitions at the national level occurred in France and probably in the United 
States (Watkins, 1987).The drop in marital fertility (primarily among rural women) observed in 
France in the late eighteenth century, apparently associated with the French Revolution. However, 
changes in fertility behavior also observed in the US on the eve of the Civil War. In some states 
more than 15% of married women born between 1861 and 1865 were childless at age 50 (Watkins, 
1987). Moreover, transition from high to low level of fertility spread with the industrial revolution. 
Transitions began first in the Northwest of Europe and followed later in the periphery of Central 
Europe and Mediterranean countries, with Ireland and Albania following even later.  
In non-western countries, time series of fertility measures were too rare before 1960, with 
the exception of Argentina, Uruguay and Chile whose populations are largely of European 
immigrants and descendants. Fertility decline was evident in a few city states (Hong Kong, 
Singapore) and island populations (Mauritius, Fiji) in the mid 1960s; shortly thereafter in many 
countries with Chinese-origin populations; and then in many parts of Latin America. A sustained 
decline in marital fertility has not yet begun in parts of North Africa and the Middle East, in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, and in sub-Saharan Africa (Watkins, 1987).  
The complex of demographic change, called today first demographic transition, has often 
been described in over-simplified terms and has spawned many disputes regarding its applicability 
to currently less developed nations, or even to the demographic history of the currently developed 
nations. Because the ‘demographic transition’ from high to low levels of mortality and fertility 
coincided, more or less, with the economic transformation of the currently developed nations, the 
empirical generalization linking economic development with demographic transformation has 
gained wide acceptance. 
The development of the idea was developed on a 1909 description of the process by 
Adolphe Landry (1934) and refined by Warren Thompson (1929). Frank Notestein was probably 
responsible for introducing the term ‘transition’ i 1945 (United Nations, 1979). He argued as 
countries became industrialized, the standard of living increased and health conditions improved, 
thus causing mortality decline. Changes in fertility tended to lag behind, but eventually fertility fell 
to almost the level of mortality. This delay reflect d the time required for the population to realize 
that mortality had declined and for the social institutions supporting high fertility to change in 
response to new industrial conditions. Prolongation of life is a universal value, but in pre-transition 
period societies, high fertility is valued as well. Thus, it was much easier to introduce changes that 
would reduce mortality than it was alter pro-natalist values that supported high fertility. Ultimately, 
industrialization and urban patterns of living resulted in higher costs and lower benefits of children 
and tended to erode pro-natalist values. 
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Among the criticism of the theory is that it is merely a description of the demographic 
history of European countries. The theory does not indicate how much development is required and 
for how long fertility decline will lag behind mortality decline, given a certain pace of 
development. Moreover, although the theory correctly describes the transitions for many developed 
nations, there were countries, such as France, where fertility may have declined before there were 
substantial declines in mortality. 
Even the description were completely accurate as applied to developed countries, there is 
no certainty that it would apply to the currently less developed nations in which the social and 
economic conditions are vastly different. This application of transition theory implicitly assumes 
that all countries will face the same demographic conditions over time, an assumption that is 
unlikely to be correct (United Nations, 1990). 
1.2.2 Recent trends in fertility behavior and Secon d Demographic transition 
According to the UN data the population of the world grew from 2.5 billion people in 1950 to about 
6.0 billion in 2000 and to 6.9 billion in 2010. However, in the mid-1960s, the annual growth rate 
was slightly higher than 2%, but in the mid-1990s thi rate dropped to about 1.5% (currently 1.2%), 
with further declines expected to continue beyond 2050. The trends towards falling population 
growth rate were primarily caused by the considerabl  change in fertility behavior and family 
formation across the world, i.e. unprecedented drop in the global level of total fertility rate was the 
main reason (Figure 1).  
Figure 1 – Trends in total fertility rate by region: 1950-2050 
 
Source: www.commons.wikimedia.org 
According to United Nations Population Division in the past 60 years, the world’s TFR has 
halved, from around 5.0 live births per woman to 2.5 live births in 2010, and it is expected to drop 
to 2.1 by 2050. All regions of the world have experienced declines in fertility rates, which have 
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fallen in the least developed countries from about 6.6 live births per woman in the early 1950s to 
about 4.8 live births in 2000, 4.5 in 2010. As a consequence the world average conceals large 
differences across countries and regions. While some countries have been experiencing below 
replacement level since the middle of 1970s or before, thers displayed fertility levels above 
replacement until recently, but observed large reductions rather quickly  
The rapid change in the value of TFR occurred in most industrialized countries across the 
world after the baby-boom mostly accompanied by changes in fertility behavior and family 
formation. By Lesthaeghe point of view, the family changes since 1960s were primarily caused by 
three major components of change. First, the already upward divorce trend accelerated 
considerably. Second, the baby-boom came to an end, i. . fertility declined at all ages and marriage 
durations simultaneously. These trends coincided with the contraceptive revolution, based on new 
hormonal contraceptives and the rediscovery of the intra-uterine device. Third, the decline in ages 
at marriage, which had started between 1880 and 1920 in most western countries, stopped 
(Lesthaeghe, 1995). 
Moreover, increasing proportions of women in industrialized countries are not only having 
a smaller number of children but having them later in life (especially first child). As fertility decline 
in most countries, the mean age of mother having the 1st child has been rising since the 1970s, 
although the largest increase has taken place in recent decade. This trend is sometime called 
postponement transition that includes also a delayed start of professional life, marriage etc (Billari, 
2005). 
Most demographers agree that delayed childbearing is largely a function of delayed 
marriage patterns that widely spread across the countries in recent decades. However, many people 
who delay getting married, especially in western societies may be living in common-law marriages, 
they are not necessarily less exposed to sexual intercourse unions. By Ram opinion the persons 
living in common-law unions are more like to delay having children and not produce as many 
children as legally married couples, because they ar  not as certain about their conjugal status 
(Ram, 2003). Moreover, delayed childbearing has increased its popularity in less developed 
countries too, and it still falls at the lower end of the reproductive life cycle.  
Usually substantial delays in the initiation of motherhood have been linked with ultimate 
childlessness. According to Ram, postponing childbearing until later ages can have an adverse 
effect on the physiological potential of women to con eive. By the other words the longer a woman 
remains childless, the less inclined she will be to have a child. Either she gets involved in activities, 
which are incompatible with lifestyles involving children or she gets used to living alone. However, 
the increase in childlessness in industrialized countries was relatively modest. Japan is a classic 
example where women start childbearing at a much later ge, but fewer remain permanently 
childless compared with women in the industrialized world. In less developed countries, the extent 
of voluntary childlessness is even smaller (Ram, 2003). 
In addition, a wide spread of contraception use and female autonomy had also considerable 
impact on childbearing. The introduction of efficient contraceptive methods brought the society to 
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extend human control over fertility (Lesthaeghe, 1995). According to Mason, the following 
findings on the effects of female autonomy and other variables on contraceptive use are discovered 
(Figure 2). A key factor argued to intervene between women’s autonomy and the use of 
contraception is the ability or willingness to engage in the innovative behavior (Caldwell, 1986). 
Where women’s autonomy is great, their education is likely to be relatively great, and better 
educated women are not only more likely to engage in innovation, but typically have more 
knowledge of contraceptive methods or of how to acquire them than do less educated women 
because of their literacy, greater familiarity with modern institutions, and greater likelihood of 
rejecting a fatalistic attitude toward life. There is good evidence that, for whatever reason, women’s 
education does indeed promote the use of contraception in most less developed countries outside of 
tropical Africa (Cochrane, 1979). Autonomy may also influence the use of contraception by 
determining women’s dependency on their in-laws (Dyson and Moore, 1983). Of course, 
dependency on in-laws will reduce the likelihood of c ntracepting only if in-laws oppose the 
restriction of fertility. This may not always be the case (Caldwell, Reddy, and Caldwell, 1982).  









































Wife's Use of 
Contaception  
Source: Mason K.O. (1987). The Impact of Women's Social Position on Fertility in Developing Countries. 
Female autonomy may also influence contraceptive use by determining the egalitarianism 
of the husband-wife relationship. Equality of spouses is supposedly linked with the likelihood of 
their communicating about fertility control, which is in turn argued to influence the use of 
contraception or at least the effectiveness of its use. The evidence in support of this hypothesis is 
apparently weak, however (Beckman, 1983; Hollerbach, 1983).  
Finally, in some cultures, women’s autonomy and statu  re said to influence contraceptive 
use by influencing the extent to which the couple abides by a sexual double standard. Where such a 
double standard exists – making it acceptable for husbands but not wives to have pre- or extra-
marital sexual relations – men may worry that the us of female contraceptive methods will free 
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their daughters or wives to violate this norm. A relat d idea is that men in cultures with a tradition 
of machismo will resist the use of contraception, not only because they find it important to insure a 
wife's sexual loyalty, but also because they believ frequent pregnancies provide proof of their 
sexual potency (Mason, 1987). 
 Table 1 – Overview of demographic and social characteristics respectively related to  the 































 Source: Lesthaeghe R. (2010). The Unfolding Story of the Second Demographic Transition.  
 Note: FDT – First Demographic Transition, SDT – Second Demographic Transition. 
FDT SCD
Rise in proportions marrying, declining Fall in proportions married, rise in age
age at first marriage at first marriage
Low or reduced cohabitation Rise in cohabitation (pre- & postmarital)
Low divorce Rise in divorce, earlier divorce
High remarriage Decline of remarriage following both
divorce and widowhood
Decline in marital fertility via Further decline in fertility via
reductions at older ages, lowering mean postponement, increasing mean age at
ages at first parenthood first parenthood, structural
subreplacement fertility
Deficient contraception, parity failures Efficient contraception (exceptions in
specific social groups)
Declining illegitimate fertility Rising extra-marital fertility,
parenthood within cohabitation
Low definitive childlessness among Rising definitive childlessness in
married couples. unions
Preoccupations with basic material Rise of "higher order" needs:
needs: income, work conditions, individual autonomy, self-actualisation,
housing, health, schooling, social expressive work and socialisation
security. Solidarity prime value values, grass-roots democracy,
recognition. Tolerance prime value.
Rising memberships of political, civic Disengagement from civic and
and community oriented networks. community oriented n tworks, social
Strengthening of social cohesion capital shifts to expr ssive and affective
types. Weakening of social cohesion.
Strong normative regulation by State Retreat of the State, second
and Churches. First secularisation wave, secularisation wave, sexual revolution,
political and social “pillarisation refusal of authority, political
"depillarisation".
Segregated gender roles, familistic Rising symmetry in gender roles,
policies, “embourgeoisement”, female economic autonomy.
promotion of breadwinner family model.
Ordered life course transitions, prudent Flexible lif  course organisation,





Dinmukhamed Shermakhanbetuly: Fertility patterns and trends in post-socialist countries contrasted with Sweden 
and the Unites States of America 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
21 
Additionally, today a government of many countries across the world provides family 
planning programs that include promotion of contraception. As a result decrease in proportion of 
married couples, increase in cohabitation, divorce, th  mean age at childbearing led to dramatically 
changes in fertility behavior and family formation across the countries of the world. In 1985 Ron 
Lesthaeghe and Dirk Van de Kaa called ‘The Second Demographic Transition’ all the mentioned 
demographic trends occurred in most industrialized societies in recent decades. Contrast between so 
called First and Second Demographic Transition was described by Lesthaeghe (Table 1).  
However, the idea and the term of the ‘Second Demographic Transition’ are not completely 
accepted by the world demographic community. Some demographers argue that there is no Second’ 
Demographic Transition, but just continuation of a single one. While the others consider that 
Second Demographic Transition is typical only for sme developed societies. 
Anyway, the transition from high to low fertility has been – in every society that has 
experienced it – a one-time event. It is a clear break with the past and so far has been an irreversibl  
process that continues until low levels of fertility are reached. The majority of the world’s 
population now lives in countries in which mortality is low and fertility is either low or the 
transition to low fertility has unambiguously begun.  
Fertility declines – completed or in progress – span the globe. They have begun in countries 
that differ widely in economic arrangements, social structures, political regimes, national histories, 
and culture, and they have begun in disparate interna ional contexts. This near-ubiquity suggests 
that the fertility transition is the outcome of a popular revolution, one that has touched the majority 
of the world’s population in one of the most intimate spects of their lives (Watkins, 1987).  
1.3 Gender equality and family policy: demographic interaction  
1.3.1 The impact of female labor force participatio n on fertility 
Throughout last century until the 1970s, the assumed institutional form of the family in all currently 
advanced countries was the male breadwinner, or family wage model under which the father goes 
out to work while the mother stays at home to look after the children. The principle underlying this 
model is that there is a natural differentiation between men and women which requires the man to 
be the provider and protector and the woman to be the caregiver and reproducer. The antithesis of 
the male breadwinner model of the family is the gender equity model. In the gender equity model of 
the family, there is income earning work, household maintenance work and caring and nurturing 
work, but gender has no specific relationship to whom who does which type of work. The gender 
equity model does not imply exact equality between the man and the woman in any heterosexual 
couple, rather that specific roles are not determined on the basis of gender. The principles upon 
which this model are based are equal respect for men and women, equality of resources and 
capabilities, parity of participation in socially valued activities, and an end to male-centred 
measures of social value (Fraser, 1994).  
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However, since the end of baby-boom era demographic trends in most industrialized 
countries observed along with changes in social values including female’s role in the society. With 
the decline in fertility rate and child care responsibility, women have more time to participate in 
labor market. Change in women economic participation has seen as a result of demographic 
transition. The behavior of female labor supply has important implications for the other 
phenomenon as well as marriage, fertility, family earnings, gender economic freedom and 
empowerment and human capital investment of next generation (Savilla et al., 2001). 
As labor force demand increased in the 1960s througt the developed world, married 
women with children began to enter the labor force; m n and single women already had high rates 
of labor force participation (Lesthaeghe 1995; Goldin 1990). Up until the 1960s, European women 
were expected to exit the labor force at marriage or childbirth and then care for their children and 
elderly parents (Esping-Andersen 1999). By 1970, about half of women ages 20-64, were in the 
labor force in developed countries (Lesthaeghe 1995). According to Hilgeman, today, 74 % of 
childless women work, while 70 % of mothers with one child work, and 62 % of mothers with two 
children work, though these rates vary significantly by country. Nowhere in Europe does the 
‘breadwinner’ model, in which men work full-time and women remain out of the labor force, 
represent more than 30% of all households (Hilgeman, 1999).  
As a consequence, women have improved their levels of education, job stability, income 
and work experience, giving them a higher status in the workplace. Between 1960 and 1980, men’s 
and women’s educational attainment converged, and fertility declined rapidly in many Western and 
Northern European countries (Hilgeman, 2004). By the opinion of Hilgeman, this type of 
investment in human capital raises both wage potential and opportunity costs. As women’s wages 
increase, the opportunity cost of home production increases for women, yet women continue to 
perform most of the housework and child care. Moreover, children clearly require time investments, 
and the responsibilities of parenting fall disproportionately on women. Mothers who work full-time 
spend twice as much time on child care and household labor as do fathers, and housewives spend 
three times as much time on child care and two and a half times as much time on household labor 
than do fathers. As women’s household and child care labor increases, wage potential (present and 
future earnings) decreases correspondingly. This income loss escalates as women’s income and job 
opportunities increase. These opportunity costs continue to prevail as long as ‘traditional definitions 
of women’s obligations to husbands and children’. The implication is that very low fertility is a 
characteristic of societies where traditional roles for mothers and wives interfere with women’s 
realization of gains from the significant improvement in education and employment opportunities 
(McDonald, 2002). 
As most demographers consider that labor force participa ion, wages, and hours of work 
during the childbearing years are crucial in determining future labor force success. There is 
evidence that women respond to these circumstances by limiting the number of children that they 
have. For instance, a British time series study on married couples for the years 1950-1983 revealed 
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that as women’s wages increased, the number of childless families increased and the number of 
three-child families decreased (Hilgeman, 2004). 
Countries in which female labor force participation has increased the most in recent 
decades have the lowest fertility rates. On the other hand, the countries that currently have the 
lowest levels of fertility (Spain, Italy and Greece) are those with relatively low levels of female 
labor force participation, while the countries with relatively high fertility levels (Denmark, France) 
have higher female labor force participation (Del Boca et al., 2003).  
According to Sweet (1973) there are four major possibilities for causality between fertility 
and women’s employment:  
the desire to work leads to restricted fertility;  
restricted fertility makes it possible to work;  
the desire for increased fertility leads to a restriction of work activity;  
work and fertility restriction both result from some third variable or combination of 
variables. 
Another important dimension was suggested by Cramer (1980), who asserted that the 
dominant effects are from fertility to employment to fertility in the long run. Saying that fertility is
influencing employment in the short run is obviously the same as taking account of the age of the 
youngest child, or as Cramer puts it, ‘most of the impact of a baby is due to its young age’. This has 
also been clearly stated by Ni Bhrolchain (1980) in her review of micro-level issues and evidence: 
‘probably the one certain causal statement that can be made with available data is that ‘fertility’ in 
the sense of the recent occurrence of a live birth reduces employment in the short run (Bernhardt, 
1993). 
Figure 3 – Summary of primary paths through which aspects of women’s social 
position may influence fertility 
 1. Women's 
Autonomy




2. If women want fewer children than men or favor f ertility control:
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Source: Mason K.O. (1987). The Impact of Women’s Social Position on Fertility in 
Developing Countries.  
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Additionally, Mason (1987) in his research presented the most plausible hypotheses about 
the paths through which aspects of women’s position may influence fertility in less developed 
countries can be summarized by the five models (Figure 3). These models suggest that women’s 
position may influence fertility through child supply, child demand, and child costs.  
First, women’s autonomy is likely to be inversely related to the importance or urgency of 
marriage for daughters, something that should influe ce age at marriage and hence the supply of 
children.  
Second, in settings where women want fewer children tha  men do or have a more positive 
attitude towards fertility control, the greater is their autonomy, the more power they will have in 
fertility decisions and the more likely they will be to engage in innovative behaviors, such as using 
modern contraceptives. These should in turn reduce fertility by reducing either the demand for 
children or the psychic costs of fertility regulation.  
Third, the greater is women’s economic dependency, the more important children will be as 
security assets and the stronger will be preferences for sons. Under certain demographic conditions, 
the latter may help to maintain high fertility, as will the former under most demographic conditions.  
Fourth, the seclusion of women is likely to lower the opportunity costs of children. Insofar 
as female autonomy leads to higher levels of female education, it should increase the opportunity 
costs of children. Both of these should affect the demand for children.  
And finally, the greater the equality of the sexes, the more the wife’s health and well-being 
are likely to enter into fertility decisions. This means that where health considerations dictate 
limiting childbearing – or lengthening interbirth intervals – higher female status may be associated 
with lower fertility (Mason, 1987). 
Most demographers agree that the more children women have, the less likely they are to 
participate in the labor force. Those who participate in the labor force tend to have fewer children.  
1.3.2 Family policy and its models 
Usually, fertility decline is associated with social, institutional and economic modernization. 
Changes in socio-economic development modified conditi s for childbearing. By Kohler opinion 
the acceptance of fertility control by one couple depends on the contemporaneous fertility behavior 
of other couples. Given this interrelation, social interaction becomes an essential determinant of 
demographic change. First, social interaction influences the distribution of knowledge in a 
population. It hence affects demographic decisions when couples face uncertainty about the 
available contraceptive methods or the dynamics of ocial change. Second, social interaction can 
establish a coordinated behavior among community members and it can enhance the effectiveness 
of media. It can thus initiate a fertility decline when thresholds, institutional inertia or economic 
development traps would otherwise inhibit or delay this process (Kohler, 1994).  
Thus, the demographic patterns occurred in the world led the governments to take proper 
measures on demographic development and its regulation. Major issue concerns fertility decline 
and changes in family formation that constitute in the long term the main challenge to welfare 
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states. Families were the primary economic units as well as reproductive unions. Children were a 
valued source of household labor and were also the preferred means to guarantee the old-age 
security of parents. Therefore family support including financial, moral and psychological on behalf 
of the government is the main issue in state family planning program.  
Family policies can be defined as an amalgam of policies directed at families with children 
and aimed at increasing their level of well-being. From a broad perspective, policies as varied as 
employment, transport, food, and education policies may be included in the definition of family 
policies in view of their potential impact on families’ well-being. In general, the literature tends 
however to opt for a narrower perspective and to restrict family policies to its core components: 
financial support for families, services and benefits for working parents, policies related to health 
and education, and family law. Even such a narrow definition still encompasses numerous types of 
policies and programs for families (Gauthier, 2002). Moreover, development in family policy may 
provide means that facilitate the combination of childbearing and female employment and therefore 
make the choice between the two unnecessary. Changes i  nder role by giving more opportunity 
to fathers participate more actively in childrearing (Andersson et al., 2010).  
Gauthier defined two main approaches in order to capture state support for families. The 
first approach consists in constructing series of indicators that reflect the amount of support 
received by various family types.  
The second approach consists in using indicators that are more highly aggregated and that 
provide measures of the overall degree of governmental effort to support families. Such an 
approach has dominated the empirical welfare state li erature and has relied on indicators such as 
governmental expenditures on family benefits (Pampel and Adams, 1992; Pampel and Williamson, 
1988; Kamerman and Kahn, 1997). While such indicators overlook the variations across families in 
terms of the amount of support received, they have the advantage of being available for a large 
number of countries, and for long time periods.  
These indicators cover two main components of state support for families: the direct and 
indirect cash benefits for families, and support fo w rking parents: 
direct and indirect cash benefits: Governments may provide financial support to families in 
various ways: they can provide direct financial support (e.g. monthly family benefits – payment) 
and they can provide indirect financial support (e.g. tax relief for dependent children). In order to 
capture these different types of support; 
support for working parents: In the context of increasing female labor force participation, 
the level of support for working parents has received increasing attention from governments. 
Various types of support may be provided to parents including maternity leave, childcare leave, 
childcare facilities, flex-time, etc. (Gauthier, 2002). 
Moreover, Anne Gauthier presented historical review of the development of family policy 
in OECD5 countries and clustered countries to four different groups:  
                                                
5 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an international economic organiz tion of 32 
countries. It defines itself as a forum of countries committed to democracy and the market economy, providing a setting to 
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Pro-family/pro-natalist model: for which the issue of a low fertility level is a main concern 
and is considered as requiring government intervention. Support for families is consequently seen 
as the responsibility of government, especially in relation to encouraging childbearing. Under this 
model, a great emphasis is placed on cash benefits and more particularly, towards the third child 
since financial obstacles are believed to be the main deterrent to the birth of a third child. This is 
especially the case in France and Quebec. In this model, relatively high levels of support are 
provided for maternity leave and child-care facilities. These measures are part of a general plan to 
reduce the obstacles to fertility, especially those between employment and family responsibilities. 
Working mothers are therefore not disapproved of, and conditions are created where being in 
employment is not an obstacle to childbearing. This pro-natalist orientation is combined with a 
relatively liberal legislation with regard to aborti n. A principle of voluntary parenthood prevails so 
as to give all families are deemed more desirable. 
Pro-traditional model: for which the preservation of the family is the main concern. 
Governments partly endorse the responsibility of supporting families, while at the same time 
encouraging a traditional male-breadwinner family. Under this model, a medium level of state 
support for families is provided. The government takes responsibility to support families, but a 
belief in the role of family, community, and charity support still dominates. Benefits for working 
mothers are provided by government, but the persistnce of some obstacles to women’s 
employment (e.g. taxation) reflects a preference for a more traditional sex-role pattern. This 
preference is also reflected in the low provision of child-care, which does not give women the 
opportunity to combine employment and family responsibility easily. Instead, the government gives 
preference to extended leave for child-care, which allows mothers to stay at home with their young 
children while retaining job security. This model of family policy is characteristic of Germany. This 
policy is not attached to any pro-natalist objective, but is presented under the label of family-
friendly policy. A certain degree of traditionalism also remains with regard to the abortion 
legislation, which is not as liberal as in other countries.  
Pro-egalitarian model: for which the promotion of greater equality between men and 
women is the main objective. Governments take full responsibility in the support of families, 
especially working parents. This model stands in sharp contrast with the previous one. Instead of 
promoting a traditional family, the main concept has been the achievement of a more egalitarian 
sex-role model. For this, the government has taken full responsibility in creating conditions and 
opportunities to allow women to combine paid employment and family responsibilities more easily, 
and to allow fathers to take a large role in child-caring. Legislation on parental leave, as opposed to 
maternal leave, has been one of the centre-pieces of this model. In addition, other benefits, such as 
leave to care for a sick child and extensive provisi n of child-care, have also been seen as ways of 
bringing equality between men and women. The set of measures and benefits is combined with a 
                                                                                                                                         
compare policy experiences, seeking answers to common problems, identifying good practices, and coordinating 
domestic and international policies of its members (Wikipedia). 
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liberal legislation on abortion, thus following the principle of voluntary parenthood, which had 
been acknowledged at very early stage in Denmark and Sweden. 
Pro-family but non-interventionist model: for which responsibility to support families is 
taken by government only for families in need. The participation of women in the labor force is not 
discouraged, but limited benefits are provided by the state to support them. Moreover, the 
traditional family continues to be highly praised. This model, thus, features a completely different 
attitude towards government’s role as welfare provider. Belief in the self-sufficiency of families, 
and in the merit of a non-regulated market, has resulted in a system of state support for families 
with very low levels of support. Cash benefits have consequently been kept at a relatively low level, 
and preference has been expressed for targeted benefits. The argument is that targeted benefits 
better support families in real need. Provision with regard to maternity leave has also been kept at 
very low level, the argument being that the governme t should not impose additional constraints 
and burdens on employers. The responsibility of providing such benefits is seen as being that of 
private employers (though collective agreements), and the state has kept its support in this field to 
minimum. Similarly, provision for child-care has been seen as falling outside government 
responsibility. Informal arrangements and provision from employers have instead been encouraged. 
Governments adhering to this model of family policy (as in the United States and Britain) are not 
apposed to the participation of women in the labor force, but they do not see the provision of 
support for working mothers as their responsibility. This approach to family policy is combined 
with a more or less liberal legislation on abortion.  
Table 2 – State support for families and policy orientation 
Policy area
Pro-natalist Traditional Egalitarian Non-interventional
Abortion Liberal Liberal- Liberal+ Liberal-/+
Cash benefits High Medium Medium Low
Maternity leave Medium Medium High Low
Child-care Medium Low High Low
Type of policies
 
Source: Gauthier A.H. (2002). Family Policies in Industrialized Countries: Is there convergence?  
These four models of family policy, as summarized in Table 2 are however found in their 
‘pure’ from only in a limited number of countries. 
1.4 Methodology 
1.4.1 Data sources and availability 
In preparing the diploma thesis, demographic data were taken from different sources of cross 
national statistical databases. Data on fertility determinants for Sweden, the USA, the Czech 
Republic and Russian Federation were sourced from published data in the public domain of the 
Human Fertility Database (HFD) founded by Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research and 
the Vienna Institute of Demography. HFD is based on one type of the initial data – officially 
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registered live birth counts by calendar year, mother’s age and biological birth order. Moreover, 
HFD includes detailed data on births, unconditional and conditional fertility rates, cohort and 
period fertility tables as well as selected aggregat  indicators such as total fertility rates, the mean 
ages at childbearing, and parity progression ratios. 
However data for the USA and Russian Federation were also completed by their national 
database sources such as Central for Disease, Control a d Prevention in the USA and Federal State 
Statistics Services in Russia.  
Data for the Republic of Kazakhstan were provided by the Agency of Statistics of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. However data on Kazakhstan were unpublished data, which was special 
output from the Agency. Central Statistical Bureau of the Republic of Latvia supplied with data on 
demographic indicators in its public domain. 
Additionally, data used in the research were completed, updated and in some cases 
corrected by the international databases of the United Nations, World Bank, World Health 
Organization regional office for Europe, Council of Europe and European Commission 
EUROSTAT. 
Demographic Yearbook of the United Nations is a comprehensive collection of 
international demographic statistics, prepared by the Statistics Division of the United Nations 
(UNSD). UNSD collects these data from national stati tical offices through a series of 
questionnaires. According to UN there are: Population Census; Population Census-Economic 
characteristics; Population Census-Household characteristics; Vital statistics; Population Estimates; 
International migration and travel statistics. The Vital statistics questionnaire collects direct 
information on fertility and derived variables (birth order, birth weight, etc.). While EUROSTAT 
provides all statistical data of its members in public domain including detailed information on 
demographic characteristics of European countries.  
Demographic data on fertility development in selected countries were collected according 
to the following characteristics: period: 1999 – 2007; female population aged 15 – 49, live births by 
age of mother and marital status; live births by age of mother according to birth order.  
The research included the analysis of recent fertility development during the period 1999 – 
2007. However data on fertility after World War II (for western countries) and the collapse of the 
socialist regime (for post-socialist countries) in 1991 were used for description of the historical 
background of some demographic trends. 
The detailed demographic data on fertility in selected countries were available in the 
mentioned sources. However, the lack of data on live births by birth order according to age of 
mother in 2005 and 2007 for Latvian women forced author to draw some charts with incomplete 
data on these countries.  
Data availability in some post-socialist countries r mains still an acute issue. Data on live 
births by age of mother in Kazakhstan fter the period of the Soviet regime is not available in 
official sources (1991-1998). This data was sourced from the public domain of the Monitoring 
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Situation of the Women and Children in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States database. 
On the other hand, organizing availability of statistical database in most post-socialist 
countries has improved in recent years. However, in order to analyze demographic trends observed 
in the nation, a government needs to create disseminated and accessible detailed demographic data. 
1.4.2 Quality of data 
Problem in quality of birth statistics in demography has still remained in most countries across the 
world. According to literature birth statistics suffer from the following five types of deficiencies: 
1) accuracy of the definition employed and of its application; 
2) completeness of registration; 
3) accuracy of allocation by place; 
4) accuracy of allocation by time; 
5) accuracy of the classification of the births in terms of demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics.  
The deficiencies of 1), 2) and 4) are overcome by most developed countries, whereas the 
other deficiencies still remain problematic issues in demographic statistics. The less developed 
countries have faced the problems of all mentioned d ficiencies, where the high attention is 
concentrated on the problem of completeness of registration. Quality of birth statistics in western 
countries of the US and Sweden does not call high doubt among demographers. While, some 
doubts are cast upon birth statistics in some selected post-socialist countries. On the other hand, the 
Soviet statistics was improved over past time Social benefits and services under the Soviet social 
welfare systems were addressed personally to individuals i.e. the territorial offices located in 
administrative-territorial units of the country had llowed to increase the quality of data gathering 
by the central statistic office.  
1.4.3 Methods 
Demography study has developed a great number of fetility measures which refines and elaborates 
regularly. The most popular methods indicating fertility are used in the research.  
Crude Birth Rate (CBR) is the most easily obtained and the most often report d fertility 
measure. It is calculated from the number of babies orn in a given year (or any other time period) 
divided by the mid-year population, and it is expressed as the number of live births per 1 000 
people:  
CBR = B /1.7.P * 1000 
where B is the total number of live births in a given year and 1.7.P is total number of mid-
year population. 
The crude birth rate is highly sensitive to the age structure of a population. The crucial 
factor is the percentage of young women of reproductive age, because these women produce most 
of the babies. 
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Thus, a population with a relatively high proportion f young people will have a higher 
crude birth rate than a population with a large propo tion of older people. 
 
The general fertility rate (GFR) (also called the fertility rate) is the number of live births 
per 1,000 women aged 15-49 in a given year. 
The general fertility rate is a somewhat more refined measure than the crude birth rate 
because it relates births to the age-sex group at risk of giving birth (usually defined as women ages 
15-49). This refinement helps eliminate distortions that might arise because of different age and sex 
distributions among populations. Thus, the general f ti ity rate is a better basis to compare fertility 
levels among populations than are changes in the crude birth rate: 
GFR = B /1.7.P15-49 
f * 1000 
where B is total number of live births and 1.7.P15-49 
f is total number of females mid-year 
population at age 15-49. 
 
Total fertility rate (TFR) is the average number of live births that would be born alive to a 
woman (or group of women) during her lifetime if she were to pass through her childbearing years 
conforming to the age-specific fertility rates of a given year. 
The TFR is the sum of the age-specific fertility rates from a cross-sectional perspective: 
TFR = ∑fx 
The TFR is a synthetic measure; no individual woman is very likely to pass through three 
decades conforming to the age-specific fertility rates of any single year. 
In reality, age-specific rates change and fluctuate from year to year, even if only gradually. 
Thus, year-to-year fluctuations in the TFR may reflect changes in the timing of births rather than 
changes in the average number of children women bear. The TFR is one of the most useful 
indicators of fertility because it gives the best picture of how many children women are currently 
having. In general, the total fertility rate is a better indicator of (current) fertility rates because, 
unlike the crude birth rate, it is not affected by the age distribution of the population. 
 
Replacement fertility is the level of fertility at which the population is just replacing itself. 
At this level of fertility (TFR = 2.1) and prevailing mortality rates, the rate of population growth is 
0 and NRR6 equals 1.0. 
 
Gross reproduction rate (GRR) is the average number of daughters that would be born to 
a woman (or group of women) during her lifetime if she passed through her childbearing years 
conforming to the age-specific fertility rates of a given year. This rate is like the TFR except that it 
counts only daughters and literally measures “reproduction” – a woman reproducing herself by 
having a daughter: 
                                                
6 Net reproduction rate (NRR) is the average number of daughters that would be born to a female (or a goup of females) 
if she passed through her lifetime conforming to the age-specific fertility and mortality rates of a given year. 
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where a – the proportion of females (Pf/P); a = 0,488 = 100/205 
 
NRR is calculated by the following formula: 
NRR = ∑fx
f * Lx/l0 
where Lx/l0  is the probability of survival from birth to completed age. 
 
Total fertility rates by birth order . The age order-specific fertility rates may be summed 
over the childbearing age range to give total fertility rates by birth order. The calculation may be 
carried out on either a period basis or cohort basis. If TFRk is the total fertility rate for birth order k, 
TFR(k) =Σfx(k) 
where TFR(k) represents the average number of births of the order k; 
where k=1, 2,…, n. 
 
Age-specific fertility rates ASFR (fx) is the number of live births to women in a specific 
age group, divided by the mid-year population of women in the same age group. Age-specific 
fertility rates are used to see differences in fertility behavior at different ages or for comparison 
over time and are also used to calculate the total fertility rate (TFR): 
fx = Bx / 1.7.Px 
f 
where Bx is the number of live births to women born at age x and 1.7.Px 
f is the number of 
female mid-year population at age x. 
In less densely populated areas, annual numbers of age-specific births may be small, 
especially for very young or very old age groups, which would result in an age-specific rate 
considered to be too unstable or unreliable for analysis. Adding additional calendar years (three or 
five-year average annual rates) and/or expanding the area to be studied should result in a larger 
number of age-specific births and more reliable rats for analysis. 
 
Age-specific fertility rate by birth order (of the second kind) is defined as the number of 
births to women in a specific age group of a given birth order per mid-year population of women of 
this age. It is used to identify fertility orders at different age: 
fx (k)=Bx(k) /1.7.Px 
f 
where Bx(k) the number of live births of a given order (k) to women born at age x and 1.7.Px 
f 
is the number of female mid-year population at age x. 
 
Parity progression ratio is the probability ak of moving from parity k to parity k+1 is 
called the parity progression ratio. Let TFR(1), TFR(2), ...TFR(k), ... represent the average number 
of births of order 1, 2, ... k per woman i.e. the proportion of women having had at least 1, 2, ... k 
children: 
a0 = TFR(1) 
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and a3= TFR(k+1)/TFR(k) 
 
Proportion of women according to number of children 
p0 = 1 – TFR(1) proportion of childless women 
p1 = TFR(1) – TFR(2) proportion of women with 1 child  
p2 = TFR(2) – TFR(3) proportion of women with 2 children 
pk = TFR(k) – TFR(k+1) proportion of women with k children 
 
Proportion of extramarital births  is calculated as the percentage of all children born t  







 is the number of live births born at age x to unmarried women in a given age 
and year and 1.7.Px 
f is the number of female mid-year population at age x and Bx
mar
 is the number of 
live births born at age x to married women in a given age and year and 1.7.Px 
f is the number of 
female mid-year population at age x. 
 
The mean age of mothers at childbearing is the weighted average of ages at birth, the 
weights being the ASFRs (fx) at each age. The mean age at childbearing is computed as the sum of 
age-specific fertility rates weighted by the mid-point of each age group, divided by the sum of the 
age-specific rates. The mean age at childbearing ca be computed as follows: 
x=Σ(x+0.5)fx/Σfx 
 
The mean age of mothers at first child’s birth is defined as the average completed year 
of age of women when their first child is born. For a given calendar year, the mean age of women at 





Decomposition of fertility measures: fertility level such as the crude birth rate, the man 
age at childbearing, or other age-aggregated indexes are affected by changes in the age structure of 
the females. In order to indentify confounding results due to the age structure and changing fertility 
intensity levels when comparing over time, decomposition method is applied. Decomposition of 
difference between two TFR into three components (Gibson): 
1) effect of changes in structure according the marital status; 
2) effect of changes in marital fertility rates; 
3) effect of changes in non-marital fertility rates. 
                                                
7 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/6/40278615.pdf 
8 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/49/41919586.pdf 
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Total effect of changes in structure according the marital status, marital fertility rates and 
non-marital fertility rates, between two periods can be computed as the following:  
1) TFR (difference in structure according the marital s tus) = a+0.5*d+0.5*e; 
2) TFR (difference in marital fertility rates) = b+0.5*d+0.5*f; 
3) TFR (difference in non-marital fertility rates) = c+0.5*e+0.5*f. 
Where a is the of effect changes in marital status; b – effect of changes in marital fertility; c 
– effect of changes in non-marital fertility; d – interaction of structure and marital fertility; e – 
interaction of structure and non-marital fertility; f – interaction of marital and non-marital fertility 

































 is marital fertility rate at age x, fx
unmar is non-marital fertility rate at age x and 
px
mar is the proportion of married women at age x, px
unmar is the proportion of unmarried women at 
age x. 
 
Baby bonus or maternity payment is a payment currently available to all families 
following the birth or adoption of a child. It is designed to recognize the extra costs incurred at the 
time of a new birth or adoption of a baby (www.carefo kids.com.au)  
 
Child care benefit is a payment from the government that helps parents with the cost of 
your child care (www.careforkids.com.au) 
 
Cohabitation is an arrangement whereby two people decide to live together on a long-term 
or permanent basis in an emotionally and/or sexually intimate relationship. The term is most 
frequently applied to couples who are not married (wikipedia). 
 
Contraception – the conscious effort of couples to regulate the number and spacing of 
births. Also known as family planning (www.census.gov)  
 
Family cash benefits are defined as child-related cash transfers to families, and such 
support is generally used by families towards the cost of raising children. 
 
Live birth – the birth of an infant, irrespective of the duration of gestation, that exhibits 
any sign of life, such as respiration, heartbeat, umbilical pulsation, or movement of voluntary 
muscles. A live birth is not always a viable birth. 
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Maternity leave (or pregnancy leave): employment-protected leave of absence for 
employed women at around the time of childbirth, or adoption in some countries.  
 
Paternity leave: employment-protected leave of absence for employed fathers at the time 
of childbirth. Paternity leave is not stipulated by international convention. Periods of paternity leave 
are much shorter than for maternity leave. Because of the short period of absence, workers on 
paternity leave often continue to receive full wage payments.  
 
Parental leave: employment-protected leave of absence for employed parents, which is 
often supplementary to specific maternity and paternity leave periods (as above), and usually, but 
not in all countries, follow the period of maternity leave. Entitlement to the parental leave period is 
individual, while entitlement to public income support is often family-based, so that in general only 
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2. ANALYTICAL PART 
2.1 Historical overview of fertility development an d family policy in 
selected countries   
Trends in fertility patterns were developing in selected countries in the context of the historical 
background, specific socio-economic conditions and in relation of definite demographic settings. In 
this chapter the family behavior of western countries of Sweden and the USA are separately 
described from the post-socialist countries of the Cz ch Republic, the Russian Federation, Latvia 
and Kazakhstan that shared the common past of political and socio-economic conditions.  
As it was presented in the previous chapter it was sometime in the 1960s that large scale 
changes in childbearing and in union formation and dissolution started happening in Western 
Europe. They comprised, among other developments, the advent of cohabitation, the retreat of 
marriage, the postponement entry into parenthood and the spread of voluntary childlessness. At the 
same time highly effective modern contraceptives began to be widely available and spreading 
quickly in some countries. As it was mentioned above after two decades, Lesthaeghe and Van de 
Kaa (1986) called it the Second Demographic Transition. (United Nations, 2002). 
2.1.1 Western countries: the United States of Ameri ca and Sweden 
The first signs of the Second Demographic Transition emerged already in the 1950s: divorce rates 
were rising, especially in the US and Scandinavia. Later on and from the second half of the 1960s 
onward, also fertility started falling from its overall ‘baby-boom’ high. Moreover, the trend with 
respect to ages at first marriage was reversed again, and proportions of singles started rising. Soon 
thereafter it became evident that premarital cohabitation was on the rise and that divorce and 
widowhood were followed less by remarriage and more by non-marital cohabitation. By the 1980s 
even procreation within cohabiting unions had spread from Scandinavia to the rest of Western 
Europe (Ron Lesthaeghe, 2008).  
The United States of America 
The United States of America is the third-largest population globally, that accounts for about 4.5% 
of the world’s population. The US population has experienced remarkable growth over the past 
century. From a base of about 152 million Americans in 1950 it added an additional 158 million 
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persons to the population between 1950 and 2010 (UN, 2010). Currently, according to World 
Population Data Sheet 2010 the population of the USA amounted to 310 millions, while total 
fertility rate is valued to 2.0. 
Fertility in the USA reached a post-World War II maximum during the peak of the ‘baby-
boom’ in the late 1950s (Table 3). The highest observed value of total fertility rate since post-
World War II period was recorded in the end 1950s.  
Table 3 – Main indicators of period fertility: Unites States of America 
-20 20-24 25-29 30+
1960 464 1278 994 931 25 26.4 22.3 3.7
1965 367 980 803 773 26 26.5 22.4 2.9
1970 350 828 717 563 23 26.0 22.4 2.5
1975 285 567 536 381 22 25.8 22.8 1.8
1980 267 574 559 419 23 26.0 23.5 1.8
1985 258 542 555 480 26 26.4 24.0 1.8
1990 300 582 605 583 28 26.6 24.4 2.1
1995 289 539 544 610 31 26.8 24.5 2.0
2000 242 545 571 696 34 27.4 25.2 2.1
2005 208 511 576 761 37 27.9 25.7 2.1
Mean age at first birth TFRYear
Sum of fertility rates in age groups (‰)
Share 30+ (%) Mean age at childbearing
 
Source: www.humanfertility.org 
Numerous reasons of such patterns were suggested by the researchers. By the opinion of H. 
Klein (author of ‘A Population History of the United States’) the return of men after 1945 who 
were conscripted to the war then allowed the fertility rise. At the same time new levels of family 
income, new availability of federal credit to the middle and lower classes for home ownership, the 
introduction of cheap mass produced tract housing, a d increasing economic mobility due to the 
higher status employment on the part of younger population all had their impact on temporarily 
reversing the trends in fertility. The space and income for providing for more children was now 
available. As a consequence Americans started to get married earlier and increase overall fertility. 
Finally during the baby-boom period, the mean age of American mothers at 1st birth reached its 
minimum (22.3) in post-World War II period (Table 3).  
In addition to significant shift in reproductive behavior occurred among Americans the 
share of the economically active population dropped b low 60 % in 1960 for the first and only time 
in the 20th century because of the large jump in births (Klein, 2004).  
After the baby-boom period fertility moved back to a long-term trend of decline, a pattern 
common to all industrial societies as the cost having children increased due to the increasing 
urbanization of the population and the increasing costs of education. At the same time women’s 
position in the society began to change towards equality with men. Women entered universities in 
larger numbers and professional careers than ever, thus delaying marriage and childbearing. Wide 
spread of birth control pill (modern contraception) i  the 1960s and 1970s gave more control to 
women over their own fertility. As a result significant drop in the value of TFR was observed in 
1970s (Table 5) and reached the level of below replacement (1.8).  
Along with decreasing fertility the mean age of mothers at 1st birth rose, divorce rates and 
popularity of cohabitation increased too.  
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Since 1980s, fertility rates were relatively stable, remaining 1.8 birth per woman. Although 
the value of total fertility rate increased in 1990s reaching the replacement level (2.1). However, 
TFR has decreased in 2010 (2.0) (UN, 2009, 2010).  
While fertility rates increased in recent decades the share of women over age 30 in overall 
fertility rose from 23 % in 1980s to 37 % in 2005. Whereas the share of younger mothers in overall 
fertility slightly decreased.  
At the same time the mean age of mothers at childbirth over the past decades did not 
changed significantly. However slight increase was ob erved in the 2000s compared with the 
1990s. However the difference in the mean age at childbearing between 1980 and 1990 was not 
more than 1 year. Whereas the difference between 1980 (26.0) and 2005 (27.9) was significant, as 
well the mean age at first childbirth rose from 23.5 in 1980 to 25.7 in 2005. These trends were 
accompanied by the considerable decrease in fertility among young women. 
Family policy (current situation) 
The USA has relatively high GDP and low ‘total taxation’ compared to EU and other developed 
countries. At the same time it does not have too much developed child care benefit policy. The US 
social assistance benefits were targeted on poor children and their parents (primarily to mothers), 
that provided through the program called Aid to Families with Dependent Children and guaranteed 
right to poor families qualified for program. That program was later superseded by a new program 
which called Temporary Assistance to Need Families (Kamerman, 2001). 
Parental leave 
The US does have an unpaid family leave and five state  (California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New 
York, and Rhode Island) have a paid temporary or short term disability benefit that covers 
pregnancy and maternity as well. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) enacted in 1993 
requires that businesses with 50 or more employees provide 12 weeks a year of job-protected, but 
unpaid, leave to qualified employees (those who have worked at least 1250 hours in the prior year), 
for birth, adoption, foster care, or personal or family illness. However, many employers offer 
maternity leaves under temporary disability plans through company policy or collective bargaining 
agreements.  
In 2002, California became the first state in the country to create a paid family leave 
program. California's groundbreaking paid family leav  law went into full effect on July 1, 2004. 
Over 12 million California workers – nearly 10% of the US work force – can receive income 
replacement for a maximum of 6 weeks (paid up to 55% of wages up to 882 $ a week for 2007) 
when they take leave to care for an ill family membr or a new child. They simply apply to a state-
administered, employee-funded insurance fund. The law was backed by a broad coalition of 
supporters, including representatives of labor, women, seniors, communities of color, children, 
parents, caregivers, the disabled, faith communities, mployers, and many, many others 
(www.childpolicyintl.org).  
Baby bonus 
There is no any baby bonus to a new born. 
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Child care benefits 
The US government does not provide the families with children for any type of child care benefits. 
However, instead of this it provides the following tax benefits to the families: 
standard deduction – is the amount that can be subtracted from the adjusted gross income to 
figure taxable income. The standard deduction is for taxpayers who do not itemize deductions 
(income is generally below 133000 $ for couples and67000 $ for singles). For 2001, the standard 
deduction for a married couple with dependent child(ren) was 7600 $; 
child tax credit – is a federal tax credit to help families with the costs of raising children up 
to the age of 17. The credit is worth up to 600 $ per child for single parent whose income is 75000 
$ or less (per year), and for married parents whose income is between 75000 $ and 110000 $. The 
credit decreases as income increases above these income limits. For the first time, the credit will be
refundable this year for eligible workers who earn bove 10000 $;  
the child and dependent care credit – is a non-refundable tax credit for employment-related 
care expenses for children under 13 years or qualifying dependents. For lower income families, the 
credit can be as much as 720 $ for one child, and 1440 $ for two or more. The amount of this credit 
depends on family income, the number of children or dependents in care, and the cost of care (the 
credit is limited to a portion of expenses of up to 2400 $ for one and 4800 $ for two or more 
children or dependents). Individuals and couples who are working and pay taxes may be eligible for 
a partial credit at all income levels, assuring them of a tax benefit worth at least 480 $ for one child 
and 960 $ for two or more if their income is above 48000 $; 
earned income tax credit – is a refundable federal tax credit for employed persons with 
moderate incomes. For families with children the maxi um credit for 2001 ranges from 2428 $ to 
4008 $ depending on the number of children and family income. To be eligible, families with one 
child must have income below 28281 $, and under 32121 $ for families with two or more children; 
adoption credit – a tax credit of up to 5000 $ (6000 $ for the adoption of a child with 
special needs) for expenses related to the adoption of a child. The credit is reduced if the family 
income is between 75000 $ and 110000 $, and not available to families whose income is above 
110000 $ (www.childpolicyintl.org). 
Along with tax benefits to the families there are variety of tax benefits and credits aid 
parents of students at all educational levels, particularly for college, and include: tax deductibility 
within limits of qualified educational loans; IRA9 savings for future educational expenses; college 
savings plans; other educational expenses in low-earner families, etc.  
Historical context 
According to Sheila Kamerman and Alfred Kahn points of view, the United States has never 
explicit national, comprehensive family or child policy, nor has there been any such policy in the 
past. Over the past century, time to time, social policies were enacted and some measures were 
directed at children or families with children. These enactments were in considerable part 
                                                
9 An Individual Retirement Arrangement (IRA) is a reti ment plan account that provides some tax advantages for 
retirement savings in the United States (Wikipedia) 
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concentrated in several ‘bursts’ during periods of reform: The Progressive Era (approximately 1895 
– 1920), the New Deal and its aftermath (1932 – 1954), the War on Poverty and Great Society 
(1961 – 1974). The Reagan-Bush interlude saw attemps to dismantle which did not upset the New 
Deal and Great Society core, but there was a freeze and some funding cuts which did damage. Then 
a hundred years after the Progressive Era, at the beginning of the Clinton Administration, there 
were new child and family initiatives, but by the middle of Clinton’s term a wave of conservative 
reaction made a major effort to dismantle a sixty-year history of increasing social entitlements.  
Sweden 
Sweden is the largest country in Scandinavia, both in erms of land area and population size which 
increased from 6.4 million to 9.4 million between 1940 and 2010. The trends begun with the 
pronounced increase during the earlier part of the twentieth century led later to decreasing growth 
rates, making immigration responsible for a significant proportion of the population increase from 
1940 to 2010. Total fertility rate has strongly fluct ated below replacement level since the late 
1960s (Table 4). Currently, according to World Population Data Sheet 2010 total fertility rate is 
valued to 1.9. 
Sweden is well-known as the forerunner of the so-called Second Demographic Transition 
characterized by the dramatic transformation of family patterns towards less committed and more 
fragile couple relationships, by the later and less likely transition to parenthood, and by the sharp 
reduction of higher-order births currently taking place in Europe and European-origin populations 
(Lesthaeghe 1995). It may seem contradictory that Sweden, as a ‘pioneer’ of the Second 
Demographic Transition, commonly associated with low fertility, also exhibits currently one of the 
highest fertility levels in Europe, with a completed f rtility close to replacement. 
After a nearly continuous fertility decline over the first four decades of the 20th  century 
followed by the baby-boom of the 1940s, and somewhat lower but stable fertility levels in the 
1950s, childbearing trends in Sweden have shown a roller-coaster pattern from the 1960s onwards 
(Hoem and Hoem 1996). Often explained by women’s sharply increasing labor-force participation, 
the TFR decreased from a high of 2.4 children per woman in 1965 to a low of 1.7 in 1980, when it 
turned, resulting in a ‘mini baby-boom’ in the late 1980s-early 1990s. In 1990 TFR reached 
replacement level for the first time since 1968, in combination with the highest female employment 
rates ever. This was followed by a marked decline in f rtility in the 1990s. In 1998-1999, the lowest 
TFR (1.5) ever in Sweden was recorded. This may be compared to the low birth rates in the mid-
1930s, when the ‘crisis of the population question’ was one of the main topics of the Swedish 
political discourse, given a TFR of around 1.7, which resulted in lower reproduction rates than 
recent comparable fertility rates, given higher death r tes then (Oláh, 2008). Even though fertility 
has been slowly increasing again since the year 2000, reaching the maximum value over the past 
decades (1.9 in 2010) (UN, 2010).  
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Table 4 – Main indicators of period fertility: Swedn 
Year Share 30+ (%) Mean age at childbearing Mean age at fi rst birth TFR
-20 20-24 25-29 30+
1960 189 645 683 681 31 27.5 25.5 2.2
1965 232 713 767 705 29 27.2 25.2 2.4
1970 165 596 639 518 27 27.0 25.9 1.9
1975 142 571 619 434 25 26.7 24.3 1.8
1980 82 475 622 498 30 27.6 25.2 1.7
1985 52 414 657 611 35 28.4 26.1 1.7
1990 68 482 778 799 38 28.6 26.3 2.1
1995 41 326 623 729 42 29.2 27.3 1.7
2000 35 236 535 745 48 29.9 28.0 1.6
2005 31 233 549 961 54 30.5 28.7 1.8
Sum of fertility rates in age groups (‰)
 
Source: www. humanfertility.org, Recent Demographic developments in Europe – Council of Europe, 1999 
At the same time the share of women over age 30 fluctuated in the 1960s and 1970 varies 
from 30 % to 25 %. However, from the 1980s the number of women (aged 30+) delivered a birth 
increased. The share of those women rose from 30 % in 1980 to 54 % in 2005 (Table 4). 
The mean age at childbearing among Swedish women ovr the past decades changed 
considerably. The mean age of mothers at first childbirth increased rose from 25.2 in 1980 to 28.7 
in 2005, whereas the mean age of mothers for all birth orders increased from 27.6 to 30.5 in the 
same period. 
The main reasons of such changes were primarily the followings: 
more women are attending school longer and are therfor  postponing childbearing; 
highly educated women have fewer children; 
a larger percentage of women are in the labor force and have more education and higher 
status jobs; 
more unmarried couples are living together and are less likely to have children than married 
couples; 
effective methods of contraception are being widely used; 
working women have difficulty finding adequate day care centers; 
the burdens of housework, caring for the children, a d cooking and shopping are being 
borne primarily by women whether they work or not? (www.academics.smcvt.edu). 
Family policy (current situation) 
Swedish family policy is based on the principles of universality and individual rights. Traditionally 
the services provided by the Swedish social security system have been universally available. This 
still applies to support to families with children. Sweden has a generous system of parental 
insurance, comprehensive school and child day-care.  
According to the report of Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2003) in Sweden the 
majority of families with children have two incomes. Most single parents are gainfully employed. 
Benefits that encourage work and make work possible thus tend to be more important than the level 
of child care benefits. Swedish financial support t families is aimed at reducing disparities in 
living conditions between households with children and without.  
Parental leave 
Swedish Early childhood education and care policy includes paid, job-protected parental leave. 
Parental leave income replacement programmes were introduced in 1974, which amended several 
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times subsequently. It is a universal social insurance benefit, to which all parents are entitled when 
giving birth or adopting a child. The insurance covers a right to leave from work with a job 
guarantee and a right to financial support during the leave; the benefit is included in taxable 
income. 
Pregnancy benefit can be paid for 7 weeks until 11 days before the expected birth to women 
who are unable to work because of physically work demands; other pregnant women may use their 
paid parental leave or sick leave for 60 days before the expected birth. There is an associated two-
week paternity leave after childbirth. Parental leave, totaling 480 days of paid leave, consists of tw 
months reserved exclusively for each parent and the remainder as a family benefit. In an OECD 
review, 35 percent of Swedish fathers took their full two months, the highest proportion in OECD 
countries (OECD, 2006). The first 13 months of leave is paid at 80 percent of wages up to a ceiling 
(and 100 percent for civil servants), another three months at a low flat rate, and the final three 
months unpaid, but still job-protected. (A non-working mother is entitled to the minimum flat rate 
benefit). (Private employers increasingly are ‘topping off’ the first four months, thus covering 100 
percent of salary for these months). The parental leave can be prorated (to cover 12.5 percent, 25 
percent, 50 percent, or 100 percent of time off from work) or shared by mother and father. The paid 
leave portions may be used until the child’s eighth birthday. All eligible mothers take advantage of 
the fully paid leave and about 80 percent of the flat rate benefit is claimed. About 75 percent of 
eligible fathers took some part of the leave, but this amounted to only 19 percent of all parental 
leave taken in 2004. At the same time Swedish fathers ave a ‘Dad’s day’, when the father of a 
new-born child is entitled to 10 days temporary parental leave on the birth of his child. These days 
are meant to be used either to welcome and take care of the new child or to take care of older 
children in the family when a new child is born. According to the report of Ministry of Health and 
Social Affairs (2003) almost all fathers make use of these days (www.iesf.es). 
Baby bonus 
Non existent 
Child care benefits 
In Sweden child care benefits are paid to all children. Child care benefits are a cash benefit 
provided to families with at least one parent residing in Sweden for at least 6 months, based on the 
presence and age of the child. The first and current law was enacted in 1947, and applies to 
Swedish residents with one or more children under ag  16 (or 20 if a student, 23 if attending a 
special school for the intellectually disabled). Child care benefit is payable at the rate of 1050 SEK 
a month (about 112 €). It is a universal benefit. There is a small supplementary allowance for the 
second child in two-children families. A special benefit for large families – with three or more 
children – and linked to child care benefit, was eliminated in 1996 but re-instated subsequently. An 
extended child care benefit is payable for children over 16 still attending compulsory school and for 
those attending upper secondary school. The benefit is excluded from taxable income. Children of 
widows and widowers may receive child care benefits in addition to the child pension. Children of 
other single parents with full custody receive a larger allowance, either from child support 
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payments or advanced maintenance allowance from the stat . A special allowance is payable to 
parents adopting a foreign child (from outside the country). The current conservative government 
has announced its intention to open the way for municipalities to introduce child-raising allowances 
for the purpose of enabling parents with children aged one to three to extend their time at home 
after the expiration of their parental leave (www.childpolicyintl.org). 
Along with child care benefits Sweden has provided to families with children as well as 
spouses and single persons by housing allowance, only to Swedish residents. It exists in two main 
forms: 
the income tested housing allowance that varies according to age, income, housing cost, 
and the number of children; 
rent payments, which are fully covered for social assistance claimants with a supplement to 
the housing allowance. 
These measures as the tax-free benefits and have ply d an important role in the incomes of 
modest and low-income families. According to the data given in the webpage of Clearinghouse on 
International Developments in Child, Youth and Family Policies at Columbia University, nearly 30 
percent of Swedish households with children received a housing allowance in 2001, largely single 
mothers (Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 2002). The scheme benefits 82 percent of 
lone parent households (OECD, 2007). 
Historical context 
Historically, Sweden has been the prototypical Scandinavian country, following a distinctive and 
generous pattern of social policy. The emergence of a Swedish model in the social policy field is 
largely a World War II phenomenon. It started with the introduction of universal old-age pensions 
and equally universal child benefits. In the 1950s thi  was followed by the introduction of earnings-
related benefits in a universal framework. Social Security benefits were further improved and 
extended in the 1960s and 1970s. The extension of the maternity leave and benefit to a parental 
policy was part of this development, as was the expansion of the public social services for the 
elderly and then for children. These benefits and services are financed by direct and indirect taxes 
and by contributions from employers and employees.  
For several decades Sweden’s family policy has been on  of the most clear examples of a 
dualearner model, where parents have been encouraged to participate in labor market and to share 
unpaid care work.10  This policy orientation has over the past four decades gradually been 
strengthened through expansions of public day-care, extended earnings-related parental leave for 
both parents and individualized income taxation of spouses. Shared responsibility over children 
after parental separation has also been promoted by making joint custody norm and enforcing 
shared economic responsibility through the maintenance system (Ferrarini and Duvander, 2009).  
                                                
10 In the dual-earner model both parents are taxed individually; parental leave supports female paid work and male care 
work; and publicly subsidized childcare is affordable, provided on a full time basis and of high pedagogical quality. 
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The Swedish dual-earner model is commonly seen as resting on three pillars: earnings-
related parental leave benefit11 with long duration; affordable, full day public day-care from the 
child’s first birthday; and individual income taxation. A fourth potential pillar, less discussed in the 
social policy literature, is that of joint custody legislation, where custodial rights and 
responsibilities of fathers have been reinforced since the late 1970s. 
Whereas public day-care has been expanded in Sweden for almost four decades. Today, 77 
percent of all children in ages 1-3 participate in publicly financed day-care as do 97 percent of all 
children in ages 4-5 (Swedish National Agency for Education 2007). Several reforms have also 
been implemented that increase pedagogical ambitions of public day-care and introduce guaranteed 
rights to participation in public day-care for all children (also those with unemployed parents). In 
2002, low fixed maximum user fees for publicly financed childcare were introduced abolishing 
most of the regional differences in price and availability that previously had existed. 
Even if the last decade has seen increased variety in he forms of childcare (such as 
cooperatives run by parents or other organizations or privately run day-care centres) the absolute 
majority of childcare is financed through public spending and follows the centrally set curriculum 
and other regulations. Almost all staff in Swedish day care centres is trained to work with children. 
Pre-school teachers with a three year tertiary degree make up around 60 percent of the staff in 
centres, the rest of the educated staff have a secondary vocational training as child-minders 
(Swedish National Agency for Education 2006). 
There are several distinctive features of the Swedish model. One is the strong emphasis on 
universal rather than targeted and means-tested social policies. Sweden is one of the two countries 
(along with Denmark) with the lowest degree of income inequality. Social assistance exists in 
Sweden and is locally administered, but it is a not a major component of social protection. A 
second distinctive feature is the stress on labor ma ket policy and the strong link between labor 
market and social policies. A third is the emphasis on ‘active’ rather than ‘passive‘’ labor market 
policies focusing on education and training of the un mployed, rather than unemployment benefits. 
And a fourth is a stress on gender equity.  
The general culture in Sweden stresses the importance of maintaining a balance between 
work and family life. Government policies support this, in particular the extensive system of 
subsidized early childhood education and care, and the extensive and generous parental leave 
policies including post childbirth, post adoption, and sick-child policies. Employers must adapt to 
these policies and apparently have done so (www.childpol cy.org). 
 
                                                
11 Earnings-related leave is financed by employers fee  but imply no direct cost to the employer when leave is used. 
Parents receive benefits related to previous earnings if they have had earnings for 240 days before childbirth. The ceiling 
of benefits is relatively high, but in the 1990s the ceiling was lagging behind real wage increases and in reality many 
parents (mostly men) received a lower benefit than t e statuated 80%. 
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2.1.2 Post-socialist countries: the Russian Federat ion, the Czech Republic, the 
Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Latvia 
Through the period of socialist regime in Eastern Europe and post-soviet republics were living in 
isolation. However, people were marrying and having children in ways that were to some extent 
similar to those of Western Europe in the baby-boom era. Family was protected and supported by 
the state that provided various measures.  
As the 1980s turned to the 1990s the collapse of socialism in Europe and in the space of 
post-soviet republics occurred. The transformation o a new political and economic order caused 
major discontinuities and growing differentiation within the region. At the same time in Western 
Europe, economic prosperity continued, social and political stability endured and multifaceted 
integration accelerated.  
The changes occurred in 1990s in the post-socialist countries a number of scholars have 
grappled with the challenge of understanding and describing the mechanisms and causes of these 
processes. As Sobotka (2004) and others (Philipov 2003, Philipov and Dorbritz, 2003) have pointed 
out, attempts to decipher the main determinants of the fertility declines of the 1990s were centred 
on two theories. The first saw the economic and social crisis of the early 1990s as the principal 
cause of the respective fertility and family formation trends. The other regarded the diffusion of 
cultural and ideational developments – namely, the adoption of new, western norms, values and 
attitudes – as the main stimulants for the demographic changes (Frejka, 2008). Many authors also 
recognized that both sets of determinants played crucial roles. As Frejka (2008) considered that 
such a dichotomization between the ‘crisis’ and the ‘cultural and ideational diffusion’ theories is a 
simplification and can lead to confusion, even if both were considered to have operated 
simultaneously.  
At the same time, in addition to the economic crisis factors that impinged on childbearing 
decisions, a new set of economic factors previously nknown in the state socialist economies 
emerged, namely, the type that evolve naturally as part of the shift towards a market economy, such 
as competition in the labor market, job insecurity and rising costs of children. However, obvious 
and simplistic it may appear, the replacement of the state socialist regimes by market economies 
and by fledgling democratic institutions of governance is the root cause of the demographic 
changes and trends during the transition period and beyond (Frejka, 2008).  
The conditions which were generally conducive for childbearing, such as job security, low-
cost housing, free education, free health care, various entitlements associated with child birth and 
childrearing, as well as a lack of career opportunities and leisure activities; were replaced by the 
considerably more restraining conditions for childbearing of job insecurity, an increasing pressure 
to acquire more education, expensive housing, lesser and declining birth and childrearing 
entitlements, as well as the availability of a variety of career opportunities, consumption attractions 
and leisure activities. The citizenry of the state socialist countries had grown accustomed to a 
relatively care-free existence, although the standard living conditions were worse than in the 
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western countries, and there were numerous unpleasant concomitants to this lifestyle. (Frejka, 
2008). 
The short description of historical fertility development and family policy to all selected 
post-socialist countries further presented. 
The Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic with the total population size 10.5 million (in 2010) declined by 0.3% between 
1990 and 2010 (UN, 2010). Currently, according to Wrld Population Data Sheet 2010 total 
fertility rate is valued 1.5.  
By the opinion of Stloukal (1998) fertility trends during the socialist era can be seen as a 
sequence of ‘temporary booms and busts’. The value of TFR in the 1960s was about the 
replacement level (2.1) and still remained until in the beginning of the 1980s. At the same time, the 
highest value of TFR was observed in the middle of 1970s (2.4).  
The most drop in the level of TFR observed after th collapse of the socialist regime in the 
country. The decrease in total fertility rate was from 1.9 in 1991 to 1.1 in 1999 that was caused by 
the fertility decrease among young women aged 20 – 4 (Rychtaříková, 2001). At the same time 
the level of fertility among older women (25 – 29) also fell (Table 5). On the other hand, a clear 
trend towards fertility recuperation took place at older ages (30+). The share of those women in 
overall fertility rose from 14% in 1980 to 26% in 2005.  
Table 5 – Main indicators of period fertility: Czech Republic 
Year Share 30+ (%) Mean age at childbearing Mean age at fi rst birth TFR
-20 20-24 25-29 30+
1960 239 921 585 374 18 25.4 22.9 2.1
1965 240 923 613 406 19 25.5 22.7 2.2
1970 238 863 512 288 15 25.0 22.5 1.9
1975 284 1063 675 379 16 25.1 22.5 2.4
1980 286 990 544 285 14 24.7 22.4 2.1
1985 268 929 514 252 13 24.6 22.3 2.0
1990 247 876 517 257 14 24.8 22.5 1.9
1995 119 516 407 237 19 25.8 23.3 1.3
2000 64 333 447 297 26 27.2 24.9 1.1
2005 54 242 502 484 26 28.6 26.6 1.3
Sum of fertility rates in age groups (‰)
 
Source: The Czech Republic: A rapid transformation of fertility and family behavior after the collapse of state socialism 
Tomáš Sobotka Anna Šťastná Kryštof Zeman Dana Hamplová Vladimíra Kantorová, 2008, Recent Demographic 
developments in Europe – Council of Europe, 1999 
Indicators of fertility timing illustrate the intensity of the ongoing transition to a later 
childbearing. The mean age of mothers at first childbirth rose from 22.4 in 1980 to 26.6 in 2005, 
whereas the mean age of mothers for all birth orders increased from 24.7 to 28.6 in the same period.  
As a result the fertility rate among young women decreased significantly which determined 
as postponing fertility, later childbearing, and higher heterogeneity in family formation and living 
arrangements.  
Changes in fertility levels observed during the 1990s were primarily caused by the 
transformation from socialist regime into market economy. However, in 2009 and 2010 the Czech 
Republic experienced the highest value of total fertility rate over the last decade (1.5).  
Family policy (current situation) 
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In order to enable better care of a child, an employer is required to provide parental leave to a 
female employee and male employee upon their request. Parental leave is provided to the mother of 
the child upon termination of the maternity leave and to the father as of the child’s birth date, in the
scope as requested by them, but no longer than until the child reaches the age of three years.  
Parental leave does not have to be taken as a single period in its full length. This means 
that, for example, if a male/female employee returns to work within the first year of the child’s life, 
he/she may request parental leave again at any time up to the child’s age of three years.  
Both female employee and male employee returning to work after their parental leave must 
be assigned to the type of work agreed in their employment contract. 
During the parental leave taken in the scope equal to the mother’s parental leave, the 
female/male employee is not entitled to any wage compensation; however, he/she is entitled to a 
state social support the child care benefit (see p.46). 
In the period during which a female employee has been taking her maternity leave, a male 
employee may take his parental leave. Parental leave may be taken by both the female and male 
employee at the same time. In the situation where the parental leave is taken by both parents at the 
same time, only one of them is entitled to the materi l benefits. 
Provisions on maternity and parental leave shall apply accordingly to placing a child in 
substitute parental care based on decision by the competent body (www.mpsv.cz). 
A female employee (mother) is entitled, in relation t  childbirth and care of the newborn 
baby, to maternity leave for a period of 28 weeks; in case of a multiple birth (two or more children), 
the mother is entitled to maternity leave for a period of 37 weeks. As a rule, a female employee 
commences her maternity leave from the beginning of the sixth week prior to the expected 
confinement date, but no earlier than from the beginning of the eighth week before that date. If a 
child was delivered stillborn, the female employee is ntitled to maternity leave for a period of 14 
weeks. Maternity leave in relation to childbirth may never be shorter than 14 weeks, and it may in 
no event be terminated or interrupted earlier than after six weeks following the confinement date. 
The time taken by a female employee for her maternity leave and parental leave, and the 
time taken by a male employee for his parental leave re considered to constitute a material 
impediment to work based on which the male/female employees absence from work must be 
excused. During this period, the female/male employee is not entitled to any wage compensation, 
but is entitled to social insurance benefits and state social support benefits. If a female employee 
returns to her job upon termination of the maternity leave, or a male employee upon termination of 
the parental leave taken up for the period, during which a woman is entitled to be in maternity 
leave, the employer is required to assign them to their original work and workplace again. If this is 
not possible because of the work having been ceased or the workplace having been scratched, the 
employer must assign them to another work corresponding to their employment contract 
(www.mpsv.cz). 
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According to a 2006 EU study on work-life balance, only 2% of Czech fathers take parental 
leave, the second lowest figure among the 21 EU countries covered by the survey 
(www.eurofound.europa.eu).  
Baby bonus 
This is a lump-sum benefit to cover the costs related to the birth of a child. If a woman who gives 
birth to a child dies and the baby bonus has not been disbursed to this woman or another person, the 
child’s father is entitled to this grant. A person who has taken a child up to the age of one year old 
into permanent care replacing parental care is alsoentitled to the birth grant. The birth grant 
amounts to 13000 CZK (520 €) for each child born (www.mpsv.cz). 
Child care benefits 
A parent, who – for an entire calendar month personally, on a day-long basis and duly cares for a 
child who is the youngest in the family, is entitled to child care benefit. It is provided at three rates 
that are set at fixed monthly amounts – increased rate, basic rate and reduced rate. 
A parent may choose the draw child care benefit for a period of two, three or four years. By 
selecting the period of support, the parent also determines the amount of the benefit, as follows: 
faster draw-down of the child care benefit at an increased rate (11400 CZK / 456 €) up to 
24 months of age of the child; however, only parents who are entitled to parental leave of at least 
380 CZK (15 €) per calendar day may apply for this form of draw-down; 
standard draw-down – following parental leave, at the basic rate (7,600 CZK / 304 €) up to 
36 months of age of the child; only parents who are entitled to parental leave may apply for this 
form of drawn-down; 
slower draw-down – following parental leave or from the birth of the child (if the parent is 
not entitled to parental leave), at the basic rate (7600 CZK / 304 €) up to 21 months of age of the 
child and, hereafter, at a reduced rate (CZK 3800 / 152 €) up to 48 months of age of the child. 
In case of disabled children, the parent is entitled o a child care benefit at the basic rate of 
7600 CZK until 7 years of age of the child, not sooner than from the day on which the child is 
diagnosed as suffering from a long-term disability or a severe long-term disability, or after 
drawing-down of the increased-rate parental allowance has been terminated, regardless of the form 
of draw-down of the child care benefit previously chosen by the parent (before the diagnosis of the 
child’s health condition). 
A precondition for the entitlement to the parental allowance is that a child under the age of 
3 years attends a crèche or other facility for pre-school children for a maximum of 5 calendar days 
in a calendar month (www.mpsv.cz). 
At the same time the Czech government provides social benefit to low-income families to 
cover the costs of their needs. Parents who care for at least one dependent child are entitled to this 
allowance provided that the family income in the prvious calendar quarter does not exceed 2.0 
times the family’s subsistence minimum (Table 6). 
The amount of the benefit varies depending on the family income and the amount of 
subsistence minimum for the dependent children. Thehigher the family income, the lower the 
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benefit. The social benefit may be raised in cases where the child suffers from a severe long-term 
disability, long-term disability or long-term illness. Situations where the parent is a single parent or 
disabled are also taken into account. A higher level of social allowance is granted to families in 
cases of multiple births – up to the age of three yars, or to families where the child is attending a 
secondary school on a daily basis or studying at a university on a full-time basis.  
Moreover the state the state provides housing benefit – a contribution to the housing costs 
for low-income families and individuals, regardless of whether they live in a council flat, 
cooperative apartment, private apartment or a private house.  
The amount of the housing benefit is calculated on the basis of the family income, the 
housing costs and the respective standard costs. According to the data of Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs of the Czech Republic on the average, it amounts to 1111 CZK (44 €) per month. 
Table 6 – Family subsistence minimum according to the number of dependent children 
in the Czech Republic (2009) 




Net monthly income 
threshold to be 
entitled to social 
allowance
One dependent child up to 6 years 7080 CZK (283 Є) 14160 CZK (566 Є)
Two dependent children 5, 8 years 9040 CZK (361 Є) 18080 CZK (723 Є)
Three dependent children 5, 8, 12 years 11000 CZK (440 Є) 22000 CZK (880 Є)
Four dependent children 5, 8, 12, 16 years 13250 CZK (530 Є) 26500 CZK (1060 Є)  
Source: www.mpsv.cz 
Historical context 
Before the collapse of socialist regime in the Czech Republic population policy was mostly pro-
natalist and interventionist which aimed at stimulating childbearing. During this period communist 
regime promoted the model of a double-income family for the family behavior patterns of the 
population, with both spouses being economically active, and provided all suitable conditions to 
support the application of this model (educational day care facilities, etc.). The traditional functions 
of the family – i.e. raising children, socialization, etc. – were assumed by the state, which largely 
strove to restrict the scope of the family’s activities to its biological reproductive function. Yet 
despite this institutional pressure, the family remained a place of intergenerational solidarity and 
mutual assistance (www.mpsv.cz). 
Since 1990 government support was limited and directed to those considered ‘most in 
need’. In addition, two important family benefits lost their explicit pro-natalist incentive. Firstly, 
instead of dependency on the number of children in the family, child care benefits became related 
to the age of the child. Secondly, extended child-care leave benefits were also made available to a 
mother or father with one child, while this cash benefit had been previously intended for women 
with two or more children (Rychtařiková, 2001).  
In 1995 the pro-natalist measures were adopted in the Czech Republic such as birth grant, 
child-care leave benefit and child allowances which were not introduced during the communist era. 
Moreover duration of payment of child-care benefit has been prolonged from three to 4 years of the 
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child’s age. Prior to parental leave women are entitl d to 28 weeks of maternity leave (6 or 8 weeks 
before childbirth). At the same time the father of a child can also receive the parental allowances 
since 1990, but employed fathers have been entitled o take paid parental leave only since 2001. 
A new government of the Social-Democratic Party which came to power in 1998 paid a 
high attention on problems of fertility decline and aging population in the country. A new concept 
of family policy was promised to be adopted.  
In contrast, in the Czech Republic ‘extreme shocks or turbulence as experienced in many 
other post-communist societies’ were avoided (Sobotka, 2008). However, within 1990s period 
Czech society experienced a shift from early and almost universal childbearing to later, lower, and 
more varied childbearing patterns. Although the most widely discussed feature of this shift had 
been the drop of the total fertility rate to one of the lowest levels in the world by the late 1990s. The
massive postponement of family formation partially was driving force of the observed decline in 
the period TFR.  
The Russian Federation 
The population of Russia peaked at 149 million in 1991, just before the breakup of the Soviet 
Union. Low birth rates and abnormally high death rates caused Russia’s population to decline at a 
0.5% annual rate, or about 750000 to 800000 people per year from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s 
(Wikipedia). Currently, according to World Population Data Sheet 2010 the population of the 
Russian Federation amounted to 142 millions, while total fertility rate is valued 1.5. 
The value of TFR in the 1960s was about replacement level (2.1) (Table 7). From the 1970s 
until the beginning of the 1980s it started to decease. However, during the baby-boom occurred in 
the Soviet Union in the middle of the 1980s the replacement level reached again.  
In the 1990s fertility has declined in all age groups of women, even the youngest (under 
20), in which fertility had been steadily rising before 1990. In all age groups except the youngest, 
the fertility rate was lower than at any time in the entire postwar period (Vishnevsky, 1995). 
The fertility decline after 1990 was due in part to factors that were not connected with the 
long-run transition, but which are not necessarily connected to the short-term crisis, either. Among 
other factors, the fertility decline is due to the timing effects which revealed themselves in the 
1980s. In this period, cross-sectional fertility indices increased due to the policy measures of the 
early 1980s.  
Consequently, the increase in the total fertility rate was bound to be followed by a decline. 
In all likelihood, this was indeed the case in the lat  1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, the timing 
effects were accompanied by other factors that existed before but became more visible under the 
influence of reforms carried out in Russia. The paternalistic-state mechanisms regulating people's 
economic, social, and demographic behavior weakened a d gave way to market mechanisms. This 
means that great numbers of families had to adapt their current plans to the new conditions, while 
extending their material and ideological capabilities for such adaptation. In terms of demographic 
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behavior, Russia was drawing closer to the countries with market economies. At the same time, the 
Russian model of procreative behavior still differs from the western one in important features. 
Table 7 – Main indicators of period fertility: Russia 
Year Share 30+ (%) Mean age at childbearing Mean age at fi rst birth TFR
-20 20-24 25-29 30+
1960
1965 124 752 601 650 31 28.2 24.8 2.1
1970 149 763 548 549 27 26.9 23.3 2.0
1975 173 794 540 464 24 25.7 22.9 2.0
1980 218 788 510 379 20 25.2 22.9 1.9
1985 235 829 588 462 22 25.9 23.2 2.1
1990 275 783 466 360 19 25.8 22.9 1.9
1995 224 564 333 212 16 24.9 22.6 1.3
2000 137 468 337 248 21 25.8 23.5 1.2
2005 131 435 389 333 26 26.6 24.1 1.3
Sum of fertility rates in age groups (‰)
 
Source: ‘From the first to second demographic transitio ’ Sergei Zakharov, 2008, author’s calculation,                      
www. humanfertility.org, Recent Demographic developments in Europe – Council of Europe, 1999 
During the 1990s Russia experienced its significant drop of the level of TFR from 1.9 in 
1990 to 1.2 in 2000. Such rapid reduction of the TFR was caused primarily by decrease of the value 
of fertility rate among women aged less than 24. Whereas fertility among older women also 
decreased, but in the end of 1990s and the beginnin of the 2000s it started slightly increasing. 
However, level of fertility of those women was much lower comparing with the beginning of 
1990s. Meanwhile fertility recuperation among women at older ages (+30) observed in the end of 
1990s and continued in the 2000s. As a consequence the mean age of mothers at all birth orders in 
2005 increased compared with 1990 from 25.8 to 26.6respectively. The mean age at first birth rose 
from 22.9 to 24.1 in the same period. However, the mean age of mothers at childbearing in the 
1960s was higher than in the 2000s . 
By the middle of the 1990s, signs of inevitable change in the Russian fertility pattern under 
discussion emerged, and arguments were made that Russia was on the threshold of the Second 
Demographic Transition (Zakharov and Ivanova, 1996). 
It was not very long before the newest trends gathered strength and naturally debunked 
most of the critical remarks. Today it is impossible to doubt that the middle of the 1990s was a 
turning point in Russian fertility and nuptiality models. The economic growth beginning in 1999 
and the consequent improvement in living standards in Russia (which today has nearly returned to 
the level prevailing at the start of the reform), was accompanied not so much by an increase in the 
birth rate, which was hoped for by the proponents of the ‘crisis’ interpretation of the previous 
decline, but more as a strengthening of the structual changes in the model of family formation 
(Zakharov, 2008). However, in 2009 and 2010 Russia di played its maximum value of total fertility 
rate (1.5). 
Family policy (current situation) 
One of the main objectives of Russian family policy is the reconciliation of family life and work in 
the society.  
Parental leave 
According to the laws adopted in the Russian Federation the parental leave continues up to child’s 
three years.  
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Until the child’s 1.5 years the person in parental le ve is granted the child rearing benefit. 
Since January 1, 2007 the benefit amounts to 40 % of the average earning (income) for the last 12 
months for socially insured working persons. It is established the minimal and maximal benefit.  
To the end of 2007 the average child rearing benefit amounts to 2369 roubles (64 €) 
monthly for the 1st child, 3371 roubles (91 €) monthly for the 2nd (the next) child. 
For students in parental leave the child rearing benefit amounts to the minimal benefit for 
socially insured working persons (www.coe.int). 
Since January 2008, the leaves payment shall not be below 1627 roubles (44 €) monthly for 
the 1st child, 3255 roubles (88 €) monthly for the 2nd (the next) child; it shall not exceed 6510 
roubles (176 €) monthly. 
Since 1995 the parental leave may be granted in full or partially to the child’s mother, 
father, grandmother, grandfather, other relatives or guardian actually nursing the child. The 
providing the parental leave for both of parents simultaneously is not available. 
Upon the request the person in the parental leave may work part-time or at home and 
reserve the right for the benefit. 
Concerning maternity leave, a woman is provided 70 calendar days before childbirth and 70 
calendar days after childbirth. The maternity leaves payment amounts to the average earning 
(income) for the last 12 months preceding the month when the leave starts. Since September, 2007 
the leaves payment shall not exceed 23,400 roubles (632 €) per a full calendar month. 
Additionally to the maternity benefit the benefit of 325 roubles (8.8 €) is granted for 
pregnant women registering for medical observation at earlier stages of pregnancy (less then 12 
week). 
In the case of multiple pregnancy the maternity leave increases from 70 to 84 calendar days 
before childbirth and from 70 to 110 calendar days fter childbirth. In the case of abnormal birth the
maternity leave increases from 70 to 86 calendar days after childbirth. 
The maternity leave is estimated in total and granted to the female notwithstanding the 
period that she actually needs before the birth. The length of maternity leave does not depend on 
child’s health. In the case of abnormal birth the maternity leave increases from 70 to 86 calendar 
days after childbirth. There is no special terms of the maternity leave for lone parents. 
Baby bonus 
For women having a new born the Russian government provides 8680 (235 €)12. There are 
supplementary payments to this grant in many regions f the country, normally associated with 
birth order. The bonus is paid for each child regardless of the employment status of the parents, to 
one of the parents on the choice of the family, or to the guardian (www.coe.int). 
Child care benefits 
This benefit is granted to one of the parents (a guardian) taking care of a child until the age of 1.5
years. Persons having a social security contract receiv  the allowance during the parental leave of 
one of the parents. The amount of the benefit equals 40% of the average wage for the preceding 12 
                                                
12 The amount fixed since 2008 
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months. Further the minimum and the maximum amounts are fixed by the governmental regulation. 
The minimum amount is 1627 roubles a month (44 €) for the first child, 3255 roubles (88 €) for the 
second (and each next) child. The maximum amount is fixed at 6150 roubles (176 €)13.  
Persons having no social security contract receive the minimum child care benefit (1627 
roubles a month for the first child, 3255 roubles for the second and for each next child). In the case
of simultaneous care for two or more children under 1.5 years the sum of the benefits is granted. 
The total sum can not be more than 100% of the statd verage income, and less than the sum of 
appropriate minimum child care allowances14. 
In the regions with laid down regional factor (Siber a, Northern Regions, Far East) the 
amount is corrected by the factor.  
The impact of the monthly child care benefit on the family income is considered as 
insignificant. According to the database on family policy of Council of Europe as for the July 2007, 
the monthly amount of the child allowance was 70 roubles in 17 subjects of the Russian Federation 
(1.9% of the minimum subsistence level for a child), from 74 to 90 roubles in 10 regions (2-2.4% of 
the minimum subsistence level for a child), 100 roubles in 22 regions (2.7% of the minimum 
subsistence level for a child), from 105 to 140 roubles in 21 regions (2.9-3.8% of the minimum 
subsistence level for a child), from 150 to 170 roubles in 6 regions (4.1-4.7% of the minimum 
subsistence level for a child), from 200 to 300 roubles in 6 regions (5.5-8.2% of the minimum 
subsistence level for a child).  
As for the impact of the child care benefit, according to the experts estimates, its reforming 
and increase helped sufficiently to prevent spreading poverty in the scope of young families taking 
care of children under 1.5 years. The weight of the c ild care allowance is about to increase from 4 
to 11% of the total income of a household, in the case of deprived families to 25%. The risk of 
slipping into poverty is reduced nearly by a quarter (www.coe.int). 
Historical context 
As the most post-socialist countries the Russian Federation experienced the considerable changes in 
socio-economic development of the country. After the collapse of the state socialist regime there 
have been no crucial changes in the profile of family policy. On the other hand the economic and 
political reforms which had gathered strength in the middle of the 1990s triggered the 
transformation of marital and reproductive behavior in the direction of an increase in the age of 
entry into marriage and the birth of children. However in the 1990s, no new initiatives in the area of 
family policy were put forward. The government supported a liberal economic model and the 
actions of the state in the area of social policy, under the pressure of powerful budget limitations, 
came down to reactive measures for ameliorating the most acute problems: pensions, 
unemployment and poverty. Attempts to preserve the real value of the packet of family benefits and 
other payments for children in conditions of high inflation were timid, delayed and on the whole 
extremely unsuccessful.  
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14 Since 2008 
Dinmukhamed Shermakhanbetuly: Fertility patterns and trends in post-socialist countries contrasted with Sweden 
and the Unites States of America 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
53 
At the same time economic growth in Russia has allowed to allocate sufficiently more 
resources for the needs of the family policy. Along with conventional measures (like benefits), new 
instruments for the family policy are developed andimplanted as well as the program of ‘Maternity 
capital’ is realized since 2007. A woman giving birth or adopting second (or further) child can 
apply for the Maternity Capital, a monetary sum, which is available for her after three years and can 
be invested in additional education for children, or in improving living conditions, or in additional 
pension for the mother.  
Moreover the major initiatives of almost all political parties in the Russian Federation 
formulate their position toward raising benefits and providing other economic support to the family 
(www.coe.int). 
The Republic of Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan has a large territory of 2.7 million square kilometers, making it the ninth largest 
country in the world. With the total population size 16.3 million (2010) decreased by 5% between 
1991 and 2010. This was primarily due to emigration, reduced fertility and increased mortality, 
particularly among men. According to World Population Data Sheet 2010 the value of total fertility 
rate was about 2.7. 
In the 1990s the economic turmoil of the transition t  a market economy caused 
excessive emigration that totaled over 1.7 million. The crude birth rate steadily declined from 23 
per 1000 in 1990 to 15 per 1000 in 1999. However, it has increased in recent years reaching 23 
births per 1000 in 2009 (United Nations, 2010).  
During the first decade of development Kazakhstan experienced the considerable changes 
in social and economic fields that marked negatively the demographic situation of the population. 
Worsening medical services, high cost of medicines and deterioration of environmental situations 
in the most of industrial cities all together deteriorated standards of living. 
Table 8 – Main indicators of period fertility: Kazakhstan 
Year Share 30+ (%) Mean age at childbearing Mean age at fi rst birth TFR
-20 20-24 25-29 30+
1990 262 1089 721 518 20 22.4 2.6
1995 249 838 619 392 19 22.2 2.1
2000 164 664 523 494 27 26.7 23.7 1.8
2005 133 703 663 718 32 27.7 24.4 2.2
Sum of fertility rates in age groups (‰)
 
Source: www.moneeinfo.org, Kazakhstan State Statistic Agency: unpublished data 
The total fertility in the 1990s showed the dramatic decline (Table 8). In the end of the 1990s it 
reached its historical minimum with the value of TFR about 1.8. The drop from 2.6 in 1990 to 1.8 
in 2000 (below replacement level) was accompanied by overall decrease in fertility rates among 
women in fertile age, particularly among young. This pattern was due to postponement of 
childbearing until good conditions for this. However, along with the improvement in socio-
economic atmosphere of the country and strengthening the certainty for the future of families about 
the childbearing. As a result in the middle of the 2000s the level of TFR was above replacement 
(2.2). Moreover the share of women above 30 year old, contributing to the TFR, rose from 20 % in 
Dinmukhamed Shermakhanbetuly: Fertility patterns and trends in post-socialist countries contrasted with Sweden 
and the Unites States of America 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
54 
1990 to 32 % in 2005. The mean age at first childbirth reached 24.4 in 2005, while in 1990 it was 
less (22.4).  
The amount of births increased significantly in the2000s (TFR – 2.7 in 2010), which is 
explained by the high level of childbearing among women, who postponed their birth until good 
conditions. Additionally, women born during the baby-boom in the Soviet period of the 1980s 
reached their fertile age. 
Family policy (current situation) 
The Kazakh family policy as a part of post-soviet policy is directed to support and improve the 
social conditions for families. However, during the economic crisis occurred in the 1990s the 
measures in this field taken by the government were limited. Along with the improvement of 
economic conditions in the country it started to concentrate its efforts on improving social and 
economic conditions for the families. Kazakhstan is an unique country among the other post-soviet 
countries which award their mothers by the state medals that called ‘Kumys alka’ for those who 
delivered 8 children and ‘Altyn alka’ for mothers having 10 children. These awards allow mothers 
for various types of benefits on behalf of governmet. Since 2010 the medals are awarded to 
mothers having at least 7 (‘Kumys alka’) and 8 (‘Altyn alka’) children respectively. Moreover, the 
mothers awarded by these medals are entitled for special state benefit in the amount of 6 MCI15 
(KZT 8478 or 45 €). 
Parental leave 
According to Kazakh legislation maternity leave is provided 70 calendar days before childbirth and 
56 calendar days after childbirth by a female employee. This may be extended to 140 days in the 
case of multiple births or complications during child birth. An employer is provided lump-sum 
grant in the amount of the average earning per month f r the last 12 months for the whole period of 
maternity leave. When a child is adopted directly from a maternity hospital, one of the parents is 
granted a leave of 56 calendar days, along with a benefit from the employer, regardless of the years 
of his/her employment.  
At the same time, for woman put to nuclear testing16 the maternity leave benefit is granted 
for 170 calendar days in normal child birth and 184 calendar days in the case of complication or 
multiple births.  
If a woman is a member of the social compulsory insurance system, she is entitled the 
benefit amounts to 40% of the average earning per month for the last 12 months until child’s 1 year 
(including child adoption). In this case child care benefit is not provided. 
Additionally, the one of the parents is provided the additional unpaid parental leave till 
child’s 3 year old during which time the employer must reserve his or her work place. However, in 
the case of child birth during the unpaid maternity leave till child’s 3 year old and would not be 
returning to the work place the maternity leave benefit is not granted. The parental leave benefit is 
                                                
15 MCI is a month calculating indicator which is updated annually. In 2010 it is KZT 1413 (7 €) 
16 The woman delivered a birth in extraordinary conditions: in area of nuclear tests. 
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not granted for those for the period of forensic medical examination, compulsory medical treatment 
by the court decision and who are under the arrest. 
Baby bonus 
The woman delivered a new born is entitled for 30 MCI (KZT 42390 or 227 €). Moreover, since 
2010 for the woman delivered 4th child and each subsequent is entitled for 50 MCI (KZT 70650 or 
378 €) There are supplementary payments to this bonus depending on regions (oblasts) in the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. 
Child care benefits 
The government of the Republic of Kazakhstan is provided child care benefits for the parent taking 
care of a child until the child’s 1 year old according to the number of children (for those who are 
not member of social compulsory insurance system): 
1st child – 5.5 MCI (KZT 7771 or 42 €) per month; 
2nd child – 6.5 MCI (KZT 9185 or 49 €) per month; 
3rd child – 7.5 MCI (KZT 10597 or 57 €) per month; 
4th and each subsequent – 8.5 MCI (KZT 12010 or 64 €) per month17. 
At the same time the administration of each oblast is entitled to provide by additional 
benefits it’s citizens. 
Historical context 
During the Soviet period, Kazakhstan’s social welfar  system was funded by the Soviet central 
government. In the early 1990s the government of a newly independent Kazakhstan started 
introduction of social measures including new pensio , social insurance, and unemployment funds.  
The reforms in social and health care systems taken in the middle of 1990s turned life 
conditions of each person in Kazakhstan. Consequently, some of negative population trends, such 
as excessive out-emigration of the labor force started to cease. Since the end of 1990s Kazakhstan 
began to reap the benefits of its reforms, especially the development of its natural richness as oil, 
gas and metallurgy industries. The increase in oil output and stable oil prices transformed the 
country’s finances and allowed a sharp increase in budgetary resources for public sector 
programmes.  
The social safety net system in Kazakhstan mainly consists of state social benefits, special 
state social benefits and Targeted Social Assistance. There are 22 types of social benefits and 
targeted social assistance (TSA) currently available in Kazakhstan. 
State social benefits, financed from the central budget, are a part of the state social 
protection system and represent periodical monetary tr nsfers to citizens in need due to disability, 
loss of the family breadwinner, or old age. 
After reaching historical minimum in total fertility rate in 1999 with the value 1.80, 
government of the country pointed out the problems of fertility as a priority in state policy. In 2000 
‘The Concept of the State Population Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ was adopted by the 
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government of the Republic of Kazakhstan that aimed on improving the demographic situation in 
the country. The administrative, economic and social measures were included to this Concept.  
However later (2001) ‘Program of demographic development of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan for the period 2001 – 2005’ which emphasized the goals on increasing fertility by 
encouraging and improving socio-economic conditions f r childbearing.  
The development of policy in the field of social and financial supports for the families is 
divided into two periods. The first is the period of the economic crisis and social uncertainty for the 
future and the second period is the increasing and improvement of socio-economic conditions in the 
country occurring after the crisis in the 1990s.  
During the second period a huge amount of measures were taken by the government. For 
instance, according to the state program on ‘State addressed social help’, this is aimed to help for 
the families in the promotion of their needs, the state program on ‘Social support for students and 
pupils of full time tuition. Reduced cost for public traffic by the local representative organs 
decision’ and ‘Housing help’ that directed to provide families with children by state dwellings. 
The Republic of Latvia 
Latvia’s population has been multiethnic for centuries. In 1994, according to official estimates, 
Latvia had a population of 2.6 million people. This figure was smaller than for the 1989 census (2.7 
million), reflecting a fundamental change in the demography of Latvia. The population in the 
republic decreased for the first time since 1945. However, according to UN data in 2010 Latvian 
population is accounted to 2.2 million people, while the value of total fertility rate was 1.3. 
Two important factors have contributed to this change. During 1991, 1992, and 1993, the 
natural increase was negative; in other words, more people died than were born. The moving 
variable has been the number of live births. In 1991 the total number live births was only 34 633, 
which was 8.7 percent less than in the previous year and 18 percent less than in 1987. The number 
of deaths remained about constant. For the first time since 1946, more deaths than live births 
occurred in 1991.The death rate increased from 13.5per 1,000 in 1992 to 16.3 per 1,000 in 1994, 
and the birth rate fell from 12.9 per 1,000 in 1992 to 9.5 per 1,000 in 1994. The postponement by 
many families of procreation was not surprising in view of the economic traumas suffered by most 
people and the general political and economic uncertainties prevailing in the country. 
An even more important factor at work in the overall decrease of population has been the 
net out-migration of mostly non indigenous individuals. The principal factors affecting the direction 
of migration included Latvia's declaration of independence and its laws checking uncontrolled 
immigration into the country. Independence brought a shift in political power to the Latvian group. 
Many individuals who could not adjust to living in a newly ‘foreign’ country or who did not want 
to accommodate the new Latvian language requirements in certain categories of employment 
decided to leave (www.countrystudies.us). 
The value of TFR in Latvia over the past decades wa not high. In 1965 it was about 1.7, 
whereas in the middle of the 1980s it reached the replacement level. 
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Since independence fertility rate significantly dropped. In 1990 Latvia experienced the 
value of TFR about 2.0, whereas in 2005 it decreased to the value of TFR about 1.3. These trends 
were primarily accompanied by decrease in fertility among young women. In 1990 fertility level 
among young women aged -20 and 20-24 was higher than in other ages (Table 9). Whereas in the 
end of 1990s the share of young women in total fertility rate fell, while the share of older women 
(+30) in total fertility rate increased from 22 % in 1990 to 39 % in 2005. However, high share of 
older women (30+) delivering children were observed in the 1960s. Along with the increasing the 
share of older women in overall fertility the mean age of mother at childbearing rose from 25.3 in 
1980 to 28.6 in 2005, while the mean age at first birth order rose from 22.9 to 25.9 in the same 
period.  
Table 9 – Main indicators of period fertility: Latvia 
Year Share 30+ (%) Mean age at childbearing Mean age at fi rst birth TFR
-20 20-24 25-29 30+
1960
1965 92 552 545 547 32 27.4 1.7
1970 139 735 593 549 27 26.4 2.0
1975 144 752 567 502 26 26.2 2.0
1980 200 774 522 404 21 25.3 22.9 1.9
1985 213 841 591 444 21 25.5 23.0 2.1
1990 250 820 498 432 22 25.4 22.7 2.0
1995 150 495 364 263 21 25.5 23.0 1.3
2000 92 394 399 354 29 26.7 23.7 1.2
2005 59 328 426 510 39 28.6 25.9 1.3
Sum of fertility rates in age groups (‰)
 
Source: www.euro.who.int; www.coe.int 
As it was presented above decrease in fertility among Latvian women began before the 
collapse of socialist regime. Latvia generally has made greater progress in rebuilding its economy 
than Russia and the other former Soviet republics. However as well as other post-socialist countries 
it has experienced painful economic downturns since reestablishing independence but in the mid-
1990s was showing signs of a sustained economic recovery.  
Family policy (current situation) 
After the collapse of the state socialist regime in Latvia, some support and programmes have been 
preserved from Soviet era, and some of them have been expanded. Today the main concerns of the 
national family policy is to provide for every family such conditions that would make it possible for 
those families to take care for as many children as they want. The measures are taken by the 
Latvian government in the field of family policy are elated to the most vulnerable families subject 
to social exclusion, poverty. 
Parental leave 
According to the Latvian law every employee has the right to parental leave in connection with the 
birth or adoption of a child. Such leave shall be granted for a period not exceeding one and a half 
years up to the day the child reaches the age of eight years. 
There are two kinds of parental benefit in Latvia: e rnings related parent’s benefit for 
employed (socially insured) persons and flat-rated child care benefit for unemployed (socially 
uninsured) persons and persons are raising children between 1 to 2 years of age. 
Parent’s benefit: the amount of benefit is 70% of the average gross wages upon which 
contributions have been paid during 12 months, but not less than LVL 63 (90 €) per month. This 
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12-month period applies from three months before the month of the child’s birth. The benefit shall 
be granted to one of the parents. Parents benefit is not granted for child due to his/her birth has been 
granted the maternity benefit of childcare benefit for the same period. 
At the same time for any woman is provided 56 calendar days of pregnancy leave of 
postnatal leaves are summed up and maternity benefit is 112 calendar days. The length of paid 
maternity leave is 16 weeks. Additionally, under specified conditions 2 weeks may be granted 
before and 2 weeks – after a birth. Thus the length of paid maternity leave varies between 16 and 20 
weeks. The amount of maternity benefit paid during maternity leave is 100 % from person’s 
average social insurance wage (average wage subject to insurance contributions) or earnings (gross 
wage). The amount of benefit does not have any ceiling (www.coe.int). 
Since 2004 the father of a child is entitled to leave of 10 calendar days to be granted within 
a two-month period after the birth of a child. Morev r, the socially insured father who has been 
granted a 10 day long leave due to birth of his child is also entitled to the paternity benefit. 
Paternity benefit is paid in the amount of 80% from the average insurance contribution wage 
calculated from the six month income (for self-employed – 12 months income), from which are 
maid social insurance contributions. 
Baby bonus 
The right to the baby bonus from the eighth day of the child’s life or from the day of the 
establishment of guardianship. The amount of bonus is LVL 296 (421 €). According to the number 
of children in the family supplementary benefit is granted too. It varies: 
1st child – LVL 100 (142 €); 
2nd child – LVL (213 €); 
3rd and each subsequent child – LVL 200 (285 €) (www.coe.int). 
Child care benefit 
Child care benefit is provided for persons who are not employed and who are raising children under 
1 year of age in the amount of LVL 50 (71 €) per month, for persons who are raising children 
between 1 to 2 years of age LVL 30 (43 €) per month. 
At the same time, the family state benefit is provided for each child in the family from the 
day of birth until the age of 15 years (or 20 years, if the child continues to study) according to the
total number of children in the family: 
for the 1st child – LVL 8 (11 €) per month; 
for the 2nd child – LVL 10 (14 €) per month; 
for the 3rd child – LVL 13 (18 €) per month; 
for the 4th and the following– LVL 14 (20 €) per month. 
Additional payment for disabled child under 18 years of age – LVL 50 (71 €) per month. 
Historical context 
In Latvia until the mid-1990s there was not established common institutional basis for the family 
policy – it was implemented through the families’ support system. In 1995 the law ‘On Social 
Assistance’ involved local governments into rendering of social services for the disadvantaged. The 
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development of various alternative care forms for children without parental care began with setting 
the need to evolve person’s social functioning skill  as the priority of the social assistance. 
In the second half of the 1990s the main attention was paid to the establishment of social 
benefits’ system for families with children. From 2001 ‘State Programme for Improvement of 
Children’s Situation’ (from 2003 – children and family) is elaborated annually accordingly to the 
‘Protection of the Rights of the Child Law’ (adopted in 1998). The aims of the Programme included 
the followings: 
creation friendly atmosphere for family; 
support in solution of accommodation problems; 
financial support for families (increasing in financial support for supplying with 
educational needs, free nourishment for pupils in the first forms); 
support in education of family members; 
support for families in critical moments; 
assistance in solutions the dependence problems (drug, alcohol and game dependence) and 
etc.  
In 2002 the government of E. Repse declared the stat ’  priority the issues of family and 
children. Further in October of this year the Cabinet of Ministers accepted the concept ‘State 
Family Policy’. This is the first and only document of such kind, which includes measures directed 
to the improvement situation not only for children, but also for family support. In 2004 ‘Action 
Plan for the Implementation of ‘State Family Concept’ for 2004 – 2013’ accepted in the Cabinet of 
Ministers.  
After 2004 some amendments to family policy were made by the government. The amount 
of childbirth allowance increased from 130 € to 421 € for every child. Before adoption of these 
amendments the mothers, which during their pregnancy had begun medical care in the 
establishment of medical treatment until the 12th week of pregnancy and continued it the whole 
pregnancy, received a double benefit 279 € but sin since the end of 2004 the amount of the 
allowance is equal to all (Kaupuza, 2005). 
In order to continue the amelioration of demographic situation in the Ministry of Welfare of 
the Republic of Latvia, responding to the initiative of the Prime Minister Aigars Kalvitis, has 
elaborated the project of the Regulations of the Cabinet Ministers, planning to set supplementary 
payment to the childbirth allowance as from 2006.  
From 2005 the amount of the child care benefit in Latvia is based on the parents’ previous 
earnings. 
On the other hand during the economic crisis in the end of 2000s some benefits were cur by 
the Latvian government.  
Finally family policy remains crucial as large parts of the population in most selected 
countries. Analysis of family policies in terms of their dynamics and developments reveals the 
impact of major structural changes at a macro level, raising daunting challenges for governments 
and public authorities. Other important shifts relat  to a growing number of, even conflicting, 
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objectives as well as actors, making the family policy process more complex and challenging 
(www.coe.int). 
Table 10 – Benefits for the families with children i selected 
countries
Parental leave Maternity leave Paternity leave
United States of America
12 weeks - unpaid (5 
states have paid 
leave)
There is no legally 
established paternity 
leave
None No Child tax credit
Sweden
81 weeks (68 weeks - 
paid), leave may be 
divided among 
parents
14 weeks - paid 2 weeks - paid None
112 € per month and child (1 
year old). Also a 
supplements for large 
families: for the 2nd child - 
11 €; for the 3rd child - 39 €; 
for the 4th child - 95 € 
None
Czech Republic
156 weeks - paid (is 
provided at four rates 
that are set at fixed 
monthly amounts 
according to duration 
of drawing), both 
parents are entitled 
for leave at the same 
time
28 weeks - paid




Depends on durationf of 
chosen drawing of child care 
benefit for a period of two, 
three or four years (see p.46)
Child tax credit
Russian Federation
156 weeks (78 
weeks - paid, 78 - 
unpaid), leave may 
be entitled to one of 
the parents or 
guardian
20 weeks - paid




Determined in the regions. 
The minimum - 44  € per 
month and child (1.5 year 
old) Also a supplements for 
large families: for the 2nd 
child - 88 € and subsequent 




156 weeks (52 
weeks - paid only for 
female employee), 
leave may be entitled 
to one of the parents 
or guardian
18 weeks - paid
There is no legally 
established paternity 
leave
218 €      (378 




42  € per month and child (1 
year old) Also a supplements 
for large families: for the 2nd 
child - 49 €, for the 3rd child - 




52 weeks - paid, 
parental leave may 
be entitled to one of 
the parents
16 weeks - paid
1.4 weeks  - paid, 
leave within a two-
month period after 
the birth of a child
421 €
11 € per month and child (15 
year old). Also a 
supplements for large 
families: for the 2nd child - 
14 €; for the 3rd child - 18 €; 
for the 4th child - 20 € 
Child tax credit
Child care benefits Other benefitsDuration of child birth related leaveCountry Baby bonus
 
Source: www.coe.int, www.childpolicyintl.org 
The way of development of family policy varies according to country’s politico-economic 
and financial situation. The family policy in US and Sweden differs significantly. US has no 
explicit family policy, but it has a coherent package of social policies that are targeted on children 
and families (Kamerman, 2001). Whereas Swedish family policy is considered as perhaps the 
closest, having elaborated quite consistently the dual-earner model over various decades. 
The post-socialist countries have had a long record and tradition in terms of family policy 
measures coming from the common socialist past. Unfortunately, due to economic crisis after the 
collapse of state socialist regime the countries faced a huge amount of economic obstacles that did 
not allow to take up the proper measures in the improvement of conditions for the families with 
children. However, along with the economic development the social and financial benefits for the 
families have improved. Today, the political establishment in all selected post-socialist countries 
pays a considerable measure for comprehensive developm nt of population policy including family 
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policy. Table 10 illustrates the main differences in social and economic benefits for the families 
with children.  
2.2 Recent trends in fertility development  
2.2.1 Total fertility rate and its dynamics 
Looking at last decade in the development of total fertility in selected countries (Figure 4) we can 
distinguish two groups of countries that displayed higher and lower level of total fertility rate. 
During the whole studied period all post-socialist countries belonged to the group of lower level of 
total fertility rate. The sole exception was Kazakhstan that experienced the higher level of total 
fertility rate as well as Sweden and the USA and forming the group with higher level of total 
fertility rate.  










Kazakhstan Czech Republic Russia Sweden USA Latvia
 
Source: www.humanfertility.org, www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan State Statistic Agency: 
unpublished data 
The trends of the development of total fertility rate in recent years in the post-socialist 
countries like the Czech Republic, Russia and Latvia were very similar. Though, Kazakhstan as the 
post-socialist state showed a different pattern. During the first half of the studied period Kazakhstan 
showed the lower level of total fertility rate than in the USA. But in the second part it displayed the 
significant increase in the level of total fertility rate as well as Sweden, whereas the USA 
experienced the moderate fertility growth. Substantial fertility increase in Kazakhstan and Sweden 
was observed due to postponed childbearing. However that increases in Kazakhstan, Sweden and 
slight changes in fertility development in the USA gradually reduced the differences among them. 
At the same time the slight increase in the development of total fertility rate occurred in the 
countries (post-socialist) with lower fertility rate was associated by the recuperation of women at 
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childbearing ages. However during the 1990s after th  collapse of the socialist regime they faced 
with the radical changes in reforming of the social and economic systems that negatively reflected 
on fertility behavior of women.  
When comparing the beginning (1999) and the end (2007) of the studied period the lowest 
fertility values were observed in 1999, while the highest TFR was achieved in all selected countries 
in 2007. Therefore, all selected countries showed a fertility growth with different speed. 
2.2.2 Fertility development by age structure and bi rth orders 
The age-specific fertility rates give a more detaild view on fertility according to age. A 
comparison of the age-specific fertility rates in all countries in selected years can be seen in Figure 
5. In 1999 the age structure of fertility in all post-socialist countries was similar. The sole exception 
was the Czech Republic that had higher fertility rate in older ages. The USA with its highest level 
of total fertility rate had a considerable part of fertility level in the age of roughly 20 – 25 years. 
Whereas a big part of fertility in Sweden was concentrated mostly in the higher age groups. 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from 
www.humanfertility.org, www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan 
State Statistic Agency: unpublished data 
In 2001 the picture did not change significantly. After 2003 all selected countries continued 
their shift of the fertility towards higher age groups. The rapid growth of fertility in the higher age 
groups occurred in Sweden and the USA. However, in 2005 the reproductive behavior of Kazakh 
women changed and they drew closer to that of Swedish women. First of all, there was a marked 
rise in the fertility of older women, who postponed their pregnancy until the better conditions. In 
later, this process gradually continued its movement. The process described took place also in all 
countries, where total fertility rate continued to increase. In 2007 the age-specific fertility rates of 
Czech women up to the age group 25 – 29 were already comparable with the fertility level of US 
and Swedish women and palpably lower than the fertility of Kazakh women. Therefore timing of 
fertility process has become an acute issue of the modern trend in fertility of all selected countries.  
Figure 6 depicts the share of individual age groups in total fertility rate of selected 
countries. In 1999 all post-socialist countries displayed similar share of total fertility rate in the 
young age group 20 – 24 (approximately 35 – 40%) with the exception of the Czech Republic that 
showed big share in the age group 25 – 29 (38%). While t e western countries experienced 
different patterns. Swedish women in the age groups 25 – 29 and 30 – 34 delivered more children 
(35% and 31% respectively) than their counterparts in the USA (28% and 22%). US women 
preferred to give a birth in young ages (20 – 24, 25 – 29) and also the share of age-specific fertility 
rate was the highest in those age groups (27% and 28% respectively).  
At the same fertility timing in Latvia and the Czech Republic started to shift to the older 
ages in later period. So among all selected countries he Czech Republic experienced the highest 
share in the age group 25 – 29 (40%). Whereas Kazakh and Russian women continued to keep their 
position of a big share in the age group of 20 – 24. However, Latvian women began to give more 
births in two age groups 20 – 24 and 25 – 29 (30% and 32% respectively). The pattern occurred in 
Latvia was similar to the USA, where the women in the same age groups shared 26% and 28% of 
the total fertility rate. Sweden kept its position with the value of 33% in both age groups (25 – 29 
and 30 – 34).  
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Figure 6 – Relative age-specific fertility rate development (in percentages): selected countries 1999, 2001, 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from 
www.humanfertility.org, www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan 
State Statistic Agency: unpublished data 
In 2003 the picture did not changed significantly. However, all selected countries continued 
a moderate increase in the share of total fertility rate towards older ages. The sole exception was 
Latvia that displayed slight stagnation.  
On the other hand in 2005 Kazakh and Russian women showed the considerable share of 
total fertility rate not only in young ages (20 – 24), but also in older ages (25 – 29) with the values 
of 32 – 34% and 30% respectively. While the Czech Republic continued to display the highest 
share in the age group 25 – 29 (39%), whereas the shar  of age-specific fertility rate among women 
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in the age group 30 – 34 increased from 17% in 1999 to 27% in 2005. At the same time Latvia 
experienced its highest share in the age group 25 –9 (32%) with the decreasing of share in the 
young ages (20 – 24) and increasing in the old ages(30 – 34). Whereas Sweden and the USA kept 
their position at the previous level. 
At the end of the studied period (2007) all selected countries experienced the same share of 
total fertility rate in the age group 25 – 29 (roughly 30%) with the exception of the Czech Republic 
that displayed in this age group the level of 36%. However, the patterns occurred in all selected in 
2007 were very similar with the patterns in 2005. 
As a result of these trends the increase of the share of total fertility rate in old ages was 
primarily related to the fertility decrease among women aged 20 – 24. The share of age-specific 
fertility rate among women in the age group 25 – 29 also did not changed considerably. Whereas 
the proportion of women delivered children in the age group 30 – 34 rose significantly. For 
instance, the share of Kazakh and Czech women in these ages were 17% in 1999, but it reached 
21% and 31% respectively in 2007. Whereas their counterparts in Latvia and Russia displayed an 
increase from 16% and 14% in 1999 to 22% and 19% respectively in 2007. However, the 
proportion of age-specific fertility rate among women in the same age group in Sweden and the 
USA also rose, but more slowly (from 31% and 22% to 35% and 24% respectively). As a 
consequence, the share of total fertility rate since 1999 in the group 25 – 29 and 30 – 34 is higher 
when compared to that of the age group 20 – 24.  
These findings are clearly shown in Table 11, where the certain ratios were calculated. The 
ratio depicts the changes whether young women aged less than 29 or women aged older than 30 
displayed a high share in total fertility rate. As decreasing the value of the ratio the older mothers 
experienced their high share in total fertility rate.  
During the whole studied period all selected countries experienced different patterns of the 
age structure of fertility. In the beginning of the studied period (1999) Russian women displayed 
the youngest age structure of fertility among all se ected countries and remained in this position 
until 2007. At the same time all post-socialist countries experienced the higher share of mothers 
aged less than 29 in total fertility rate. While th proportion of US and Swedish mothers aged more 
than 30 years shared a high proportion in total fertility rate. Table 11 shows that all post-socialist 
countries displayed their highest value of the ratio until 2004, but in 2005 the positions of Latvia 
and the Czech Republic were replaced by the younger mothers from the USA. However, after one 
year (in 2006) Latvia returned its 3rd position and remained in this position until the end of the 
studied period (2007) with the value of ratio 1.9. As a consequence all selected countries 
experienced the decreasing the value of the ratio which is determined as increasing the share of 
older women in total fertility rate. Whereas in 1999 Kazakh women aged less than 29 were being 
4th state among countries shared the younger age structure of fertility became the 2nd in the end of 
the studied period (2007). However in 2007 the Czech Republic was in the 5th position among 6 
selected countries shared the younger age structure of fertility while it was in the 3rd position in the 
beginning of the studied period (1999).  
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Table 11 – Changes in fertility age profile in 1999 – 2007 
1999 ASFR(-29) ASFR(30+) TFR RATIO Correlation 2003 ASFR(-29) ASFR(30+) TFR RATIO Correlation
Russia 0.93 0.23 1.2 4.0 Russia 0.99 0.31 1.3 3.2
Latvia 0.90 0.28 1.2 3.2 Latvia 0.90 0.38 1.3 2.3
Czech Republic 0.87 0.27 1.1 3.2 Kazakhstan 1.42 0.61 2.0 2.3
Kazakhstan 1.34 0.46 1.8 2.9 Czech Republic 0.79 0.39 1.2 2.0
USA 1.34 0.67 2.0 2.0 USA 1.30 0.75 2.0 1.7
Sweden 0.79 0.71 1.5 1.1 Sweden 0.82 0.90 1.7 0.9
-0.56 -0.39
 
2000 ASFR(-29) ASFR(30+) TFR RATIO Correlation 2004 ASFR(-29) ASFR(30+) TFR RATIO Correlation
Russia 0.94 0.25 1.2 3.8 Russia 0.98 0.31 1.3 3.1
Czech Republic 0.85 0.30 1.2 2.9 Latvia 0.86 0.39 1.2 2.2
Latvia 0.92 0.32 1.2 2.8 Kazakhstan 1.51 0.70 2.2 2.2
Kazakhstan 1.35 0.49 1.8 2.7 Czech Republic 0.79 0.43 1.2 1.8
USA 1.36 0.70 2.1 2.0 USA 1.30 0.76 2.1 1.7
Sweden 0.81 0.74 1.6 1.1 Sweden 0.82 0.94 1.8 0.9
-0.52 -0.35
 
2001 ASFR(-29) ASFR(30+) TFR RATIO Correlation 2005 ASFR(-29) ASFR(30+) TFR RATIO Correlation
Russia 0.95 0.27 1.2 3.6 Russia 0.95 0.33 1.3 2.9
Kazakhstan 1.33 0.51 1.8 2.6 Kazakhstan 1.50 0.72 2.2 2.1
Czech Republic 0.82 0.33 1.1 2.5 USA 1.29 0.76 2.1 1.7
Latvia 0.82 0.39 1.2 2.1 Czech Republic 0.80 0.48 1.3 1.6
USA 1.33 0.70 2.0 1.9 Latvia 0.81 0.51 1.3 1.6
Sweden 0.79 0.78 1.6 1.0 Sweden 0.81 0.96 1.8 0.8
-0.36 -0.18
 
2002 ASFR(-29) ASFR(30+) TFR RATIO Correlation 2006 ASFR(-29) ASFR(30+) TFR RATIO Correlation
Russia 0.99 0.29 1.3 3.3 Russia 0.95 0.34 1.3 2.8
Latvia 0.88 0.36 1.2 2.5 Kazakhstan 1.56 0.79 2.4 2.0
Kazakhstan 1.33 0.55 1.9 2.4 Latvia 0.89 0.46 1.4 1.9
Czech Republic 0.81 0.36 1.2 2.3 USA 1.33 0.78 2.1 1.7
USA 1.31 0.72 2.0 1.8 Czech Republic 0.79 0.54 1.3 1.5
Sweden 0.82 0.84 1.7 1.0 Sweden 0.84 1.02 1.9 0.8
-0.46 -0.27
 
2007 ASFR(-29) ASFR(30+) TFR RATIO Correlation
Russia 1.00 0.40 1.4 2.5
Kazakhstan 1.62 0.85 2.5 1.9
Latvia 0.92 0.49 1.4 1.9
USA 1.34 0.79 2.1 1.7
Czech Republic 0.82 0.62 1.4 1.3
Sweden 0.84 1.03 1.9 0.8
-0.13
 
  Source: Author’s calculations based on data from 
  www.humanfertility.org, www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan 
  State Statistic Agency: unpublished data 
  Note: Where Ratio is calculated by formula:      
  ASFR(-29)/ASFR(30+). Pearson coefficient of correlation 
  was defined between the variables of TFR and Ratio 
In addition the correlation between the variables of ratio and total fertility rate is clearly 
seen in that Table 11 too. The closer the value of correlation coefficient to – 1 the stronger the 
negative correlation between ratio and total fertility rate meaning that total fertility rate increases 
when the fertility structure becomes older, as closer to 0 the stronger independence of the variables. 
As Table 11 depicts that during the whole period the correlation of the variables became more less. 
In 1999 the value of coefficient of correlation was – 0.56, whereas in 2001 it was – 0.36. However 
one year later (in 2002) the value was – 0.46, which was determined as strengthening the 
dependence of total fertility rate on ratio. As decreasing of the value of coefficient correlation in 
further years as variables became more independent. In 2007 it reached the value of – 0.13 which 
determined as weakening trend in correlation between th  variables. 
2.2.2 Mean age of mothers at childbirth and birth o rders 
Further we will analyze the development of the structure of fertility according to age in the studied 
period. One of the characteristics of the structure of fertility is the mean age of mothers (Figure 7). 
The mean age of mothers in all selected countries increased. The exceptions were the rapid changes 
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in the mean age of mothers in Latvia in 2005 and the moderate reduction in the USA during 2005 – 
2006 in comparison with the previous years. In 1999 the mean age of mothers in the Czech 
Republic was 26.9, but further growth was, however, strikingly faster than in other countries, so 
that mean age of mothers in the Czech Republic was moving closer to the Swedish level and further 
away from the other selected countries. The fact that during the whole studied period the mean age 
of mothers at all birth orders was also higher in Kazakhstan than in Russia, associated particularly 
by the fact that in Kazakhstan relatively more children of higher birth order were born. 












Kazakhstan Czech Republic Russia Sweden USA Latvia
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from www.humanfertility.org, 
www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan State Statistic Agency: unpublished data  
Note: Calculated from the ASFR distribution 
Concerning the individual birth orders we see that e values of the mean age of mothers of 
all monitored period in the USA were relatively stable (Figure 8). At the same time, Swedish 
women bore children of the appropriate birth order roughly a year and a half later than the nearest 
neighbor of Czech women. The exception was the mean age of mothers of the 5th and higher birth 
orders, where Kazakh women delivered relatively more children of the 6th and higher birth orders.  
During the whole studied period the value of the mean age of mothers at first birth order 
was approximately higher in Sweden for two and three y ars. However, Kazakhstan and Russia 
experienced the lowest one. Whereas the mean age of the US mothers in the middle of 2000s 
started its moderate stagnation. The increase of this value in the Czech Republic was faster and 
began exceeding the level of the USA.  
Figure 8 depicts that difference of the mean age of m thers at the second birth order 
between countries lowered. The levels of the mean age of mothers in all selected countries 
significantly increased approximately by three years. The value of the USA became the lowest one 
and closer to the level of Kazakh mothers. However, in comparison with the values of the mean age 
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of mothers at first birth order in Latvia and Russia the difference of theses values at second birth 
order roughly reached 4 and 5 years. It again could be explained by the fact that Latvian and 
Russian women delivered relatively more children in higher birth orders.  
The mean age of mothers at third birth order rose in all selected countries. But, after 2005 
the level of the mean age of mothers in the USA started to stagnate. Therefore, its level was the 
lowest among the countries. Meanwhile, the mean age of mothers in the Czech Republic and Latvia 
reduced the differences to minimum with the level of Swedish mothers. The rapid change of the 
values of the mean age of Latvian mothers continued. However, the younger mothers among post-
socialist countries were still remained in Kazakhstan. 
During the whole studied period the mean age of mothers at fourth birth order in all post-
socialist countries increased. However, in Sweden and the USA the moderate increase continued 
until 2005 and then it was replaced by some stagnation nd subsequent growth. Whereas the USA 
and Sweden displayed the highest and lowest fertility level respectively of this value among all 
selected countries. 
The interesting picture occurred in the mean age of mothers at fifth and higher birth orders. 
The level of this value in all post-socialist countries increased with some instability, therefore they 
became much more closer to the Swedish level. However, the mean age of mothers in Sweden and 
the USA were still remained the highest and lowest one respectively. Whereas the value of the 
mean age of Kazakh mothers was moving away from all countries level and closer to Swedish 
mothers. The reason of such special case was that in Kazakhstan relatively more children of the 
fifth and higher birth orders were born than in other post-socialist countries. On the other hand, the 
increase of the mean age of mothers in Kazakhstan was not as significant as previous birth orders. 
We can see that in the period until 2002 the values of the mean age of mothers for the fifth 
birth order in Sweden and Kazakhstan were comparable. In 2003 there were moderate shift in 
fertility towards a younger age, but later, on the contrary, the shift of fertility to a late age with t e 
exception of Swedish level in 2006.  
The birth order-specific analysis presented above offers a vastly different portrait of fertility 
levels and trends in the group of post-socialist countries and western countries of Sweden and the 
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 Source: Author’s calculations based on data from 
 www.humanfertility.org, www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan 
 State Statistic Agency: unpublished data  
 Note: Calculated  from the ASFR distribution 
The whole European countries experienced a general trend towards convergence in the 
overall fertility level and in the timing of fertility. Whereas Kazakhstan and the USA displayed the 
same trend towards convergence with each other. Nevertheless, several contrasts characterized their 
birth order-specific fertility patterns. 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from www.humanfertility.org, www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan State Statistic 
Agency: unpublished data 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from www.humanfertility.org, www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan State Statistic 
Agency: unpublished data 
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Figure 12 – Relative age-specific fertility rate development of the 1st birth order (in percentages): selected 
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Author’s calculations based on data from www.humanfertility.org, www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan State Statistic Agency: 
unpublished data 
Figure 13 – Age-specific fertility rate development of the 2nd birth order (in percentages): selected 
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Author’s calculations based on data from www.humanfertility.org, www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan State Statistic Agency: 
unpublished data 
Figure 14 – Age-specific fertility rate development of the 3rd and higher birth orders (in percentages): 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from www.humanfertility.org, www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan State Statistic 
Agency: unpublished data 
Women in Kazakhstan, Sweden and the USA retained relativ ly high first birth rates, but 
they experienced different age-specific fertility rate of the third and higher birth orders, where 
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Sweden level was very low, but considerably higher among the women in the other post-socialist 
countries. Kazakh and Russian delivered a child at younger age than the women of other selected 
countries, while the women of all selected countries progressively postponed not only the birth of 
their first child, but also of their second and third children (Figures 9, 10 and 11).  
The share of individual age groups in total fertility rates of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and higher birth 
orders of selected countries are clearly seen in Figures 12 – 14. In the beginning of the studied 
period (1999) all post-socialist countries displayed the highest share of the total fertility rate of the
1st birth order in the young age group 20 – 24 (roughly 50%). Whereas Sweden and the USA 
showed different patterns. The proportion of Swedish women in the age group 25 – 29 in the total 
fertility rate of the 1st birth order was 32%. While their counterparts in the USA delivered only 25% 
of all births of the 1st order in this age-group. However, the USA displayed its big proportion in the
young age group 20 – 24 (30%), which was similar to the patterns of the post-socialist countries. 
On the other hand, Czech women displayed a considerable share in the old age group 25 – 29 
(32%), which was closer to the value of Swedish women in the same age group (38%). 
In 2005 the picture changed due to the significant increase in the share of women in the old 
ages. Kazakhstan and Russia displayed their highest s are in the age group 20 – 24 (roughly 50%). 
However, the increase in the share of birth rates in Kazakhstan and Russia in the age group 25 – 29 
from 19% and 20% in 1999 to 24% and 27% respectively was primarily caused by the fertility 
decrease of the 1st birth order among young women aged 15 – 19 from 21% to 14% and 17% 
respectively in 2005. At the same time the Czech Republic and Latvia experienced a shift from 
young ages towards old ages. The increase in the share of total fertility rate of the 1st birth order 
among Czech and Latvian women aged 25 – 29 from 32%and 24% in 1999 to 44% and 35% 
respectively in 2005 was caused by the fertility decrease among women in the age groups 15 – 19 
and 20 – 24. Whereas Swedish and US women showed the same patterns as in 1999, with a small 
exception of Swedish women aged 30 – 34, who increased their share from 24% in 1999 to 29% in 
2005. 
On the other hand in the beginning of the studied priod (1999) a high share of the total 
fertility rate of the 2nd birth order made up the women in the age group 25 – 29 of all selected 
countries. The sole exception was Kazakhstan, where the share of the women in this age group 
(37%) was less than the women aged 20 – 24 (40%). At the same time Sweden and the USA shared 
the proportion of birth rate among the other ages. For instance, the USA displayed a considerable 
share of fertility rate in three age groups 20 – 24 (29%), 25 – 29 (29%) and 30 – 34 (24%). Whereas 
the proportion of Swedish women delivered the 2nd birth was high in two age groups 25 – 29 (37%) 
and 30 – 34 (35%). 
The considerable shift in the proportion of the women delivered their 2nd birth towards old 
ages was observed in the end of the studied period. In 2005 the almost a high share of the total 
fertility rate of the 2nd birth order made up the women aged 25 – 29. Such pattern occurred in all 
selected countries with the exception of Sweden and Latvia that experienced their high share in the 
age group 30 – 34 (41% and 35% respectively). However, the share of Czech women delivered the 
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2nd birth in 2005 in this age group was 37% which was the highest value among all post-socialist 
countries. The increase in the share of Czech women in the age group 30 – 34 from 21% in 1999 to 
37% in 2005 was caused by the fertility decrease among young women aged 20 – 24 from 25% in 
1999 to 12% in 2005. 
As the women of selected countries during the whole studied period experienced a high 
share of the total fertility rate of the 1st and 2nd birth orders relatively in young ages the proportion 
of the women delivered their 3rd birth was more concentrated in old ages. In 1999 a high share of 
the total fertility rate of the 3rd and high birth orders were among women aged 25 – 29 and 30 – 34. 
This pattern occurred in all selected countries with the sole exception of Sweden that displayed its 
highest share in the 30 – 34 age group (40%). At the same time the share of birth rate of Swedish 
women delivered the 3rd and more births in the age groups 20 – 24 and 35 – 9 was the lowest and 
highest among all selected countries (4% and 27% respectively). Whereas US women experienced 
the highest share of the total fertility rate of the 3rd and higher birth orders in the young ages 20 – 24 
(20%) and lowest in the age group 30 – 34 (29%) among all selected countries. During the whole 
studied period the share of the total fertility rate of the 3rd and higher birth orders shifted towards 
old aged women. In 2005 the increase in the proportion of the women delivered their 3rd and more 
births in the age group 35 – 39 in all selected countries was caused by the decrease of the share 
among young women aged 20 – 24 and 25 – 29. The significant decrease was observed among 
Czech, Latvian and Swedish women in the age group 25 – 9. Whereas the fertility patterns among 
Kazakh and US women in this age-group changed less, from 32% and 30% in 1999 to 29% and 
31% respectively in 2005. The share of the birth rate among women aged 35 – 39 significantly 
increased in the Czech Republic and Latvia from 20% in 1999 to 28% and 31% respectively in 
2005. As a consequence of these trends in the fertility behavior of the women among selected 
countries the process of the convergence in post-socialist countries with the western countries has 
started. 
2.2.3 Hypothetical family composition and parity pr ogression ratios 
Figure 15 features a hypothetical family size composition which was a result from the birth order-
specific trends of selected years. However the indicators calculated are cross sectional. Therefore 
the changes in birth rates by birth order had a considerable impact on changing in the proportion of 
women according to their number of children. The figure described the patterns in 2006 of the 
studied period displayed more real picture of the current patterns in selected countries. In 2000 US 
and Kazakh women displayed the highest share of larger families (28% and 22% respectively with 
3 and more children), while US and Swedish women stood out for a high proportion of families 
with two children (36% and 33% respectively) and relatively low childlessness occurred in the 
USA (18%). Russian women displayed a fairly high share of families with one child (35%). At the 
same time the Czech Republic and Latvia showed the highest proportion of childless women (47% 
and 40% respectively). The family with one child was less popular in the Czech Republic (11%). 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on total fertility rates by birth order; data from www.humanfertility.org, 
www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan State Statistic Agency: unpublished data  
In 2002 the portrait of the patterns in the most of selected countries did not changed 
significantly. However Sweden and Russia dropped thir proportion of childless women from 31% 
and 30% in 2000 to 23% and 26% respectively. In 2004 the popularity of two child families 
increased considerably in all selected countries. The sole exception was the USA that showed some 
stagnation in the comparison with the previous years. As a consequence the patterns in all selected 
changed towards reduction of childless women and rising of larger families. The significant 
reduction in the proportion of childless women was occurred in Kazakhstan, Sweden and the Czech 
Republic that displayed drop from 23%, 31% and 47% in 2000 to 7%, 15% and 35% in 2006. Due 
to the reduction of the share of childless women in the Czech Republic the proportion of Czech 
women with one child increased from 11% in 2000 to 19% in 2006.  
The popularity of two child families during the studied period also continued to develop in 
all selected countries. In the beginning of the studied period (2000) US and Swedish women 
showed the highest share of two child families (36% and 33% respectively). However, in 2006 they 
shares that place with Czech women (35%). While the significant increase in the share of women 
with two children occurred in Sweden that displayed rise from 33% in 2000 to 46% in 2006. 
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Kazakhstan and the USA remained in the top position of women having 3 and more 
children. Moreover they strengthened their position due to increase in the share of those women 
from 22% and 28% in 2000 to 33% and 29% respectively.  
These findings are in agreement with some long-standing fertility patterns in these 
countries of previous years, such as a strong orientat o  towards a two-child family model in 
Sweden and the Czech Republic and a higher share of larger families in Kazakhstan and the USA. 
In Kazakhstan, however they constituted a departure from the previous family model, and imply a 
pronounced increase the proportion of two and three children families on account of a declining 
proportion of childless women. It remains to be seen whether this is a temporary trend or real shift 
in family patterns. 
Parity progression ratios 
Parity progression ratios revealed a persistent popularity of a two-child family model in the 
analyzed countries (Figure 16). This pattern was mot stable in the USA, where the value of the 
progression ratio still remained on the level 0,8 during the whole studied period, whereas the 
progression ratios to the third and fourth births were significantly lower and remained on the level 
of 0.50 and 0.40 respectively. However the probability of having another birth of US women was 
one of the highest among the selected countries. 
A comparison of recent trends in parity progression ratios revealed several differences, 
most of which persisted over all the studied period. In the beginning of the 2000’s the probability of 
having 2nd child in the Czech Republic was closer to the level of the USA (0.80) and even above the 
level of Sweden (0.75). But, later it started to move towards the pattern of other post-socialist 
countries, where Kazakhstan showed the highest level (above 0.70) among the rest. Latvia 
experienced some changes of the parity progression ratio development to the second birth during 
the first half of the studied period and increasing its level during the second part by reaching 0.66 
level in 2007. Russian women displayed a fairly stable development of the progression ratio to the 
second birth towards increasing, whereas the progression rates to the third and fourth remained 
stable during the whole studied period. 
The probability of having 3rd child was widely spread in Kazakhstan and the USA with 
their parity progression rates roughly over 0.50, while the trend of this in other post-socialist 
countries was similar and moderately below the level of Sweden (approximately over 0.35). Thus, 
the long-standing postponement of childbearing among Kazakh women had not affected their 
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 Source: Author’s calculations based on data from 
 www.humanfertility.org, www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan 
 State  Statistic Agency: unpublished data 
 Note: PPR1_2 (Parity progression ratio) is the probability 
 a1 of moving from parity 1 to parity 2, PPR2_3 is the 
 probability a2 of moving from parity 2 to parity 3 
A comparison of recent trends in parity progression ratios to the fourth birth was much 
more interesting. Kazakh women continued to display the highest progression ratio to the fourth 
birth (approximately 0.50). Whereas in other post-socialist countries the probability declined to the 
level below 0.30. The sole exception was in Latvia (above 0.30), that displayed some instable 
development of the trend, but considerably below the level recorded in the USA (0.40). Swedish 
women also experienced the lowest progression ratio to he fourth birth (below 0.40). 
2.3 Development of extramarital live births in sele cted countries 
2.3.1 Trends in extramarital live births 
Trends in fertility rates have often been accompanied by changes in the prevailing attitudes towards 
marriage, family formation and parenthood. In the most analyzed countries the number of parents 
who were not married at the time of having a birth ncreased from the past. The vast majority of 
increase in extramarital live births in the countries of Western Europe was due to births within 
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cohabitation, whereas in post-socialist countries the increase of children born out-of-wedlock was 
accompanied by rising in the amount of single mothers.  
According to some demographers one of the most explanations for changing marital and 
non-marital childbearing in the Western Europe is the Second Demographic Transition. 
Cohabitation as one the basic features of the Second Demographic Transition partially played the 
role in the increasing amount of extramarital live births. At the same time social support for women 
without legal partner in the most countries of Western Europe particularly in the Scandinavian 
countries, allow them to provide their needs independently of partners. As a result childbearing 
within cohabitating unions has its some advantages.  
By the opinion of Bernhardt in contemporary western countries, many choices largely made 
in the past on the basis of social prescriptions have now become options. This creates a whole new 
set of risks as well as a higher degree of individual uncertainty. As a result new stages in the life 
course have emerged, resulting in a ‘destandardisation’ of family-formation patterns. Cohabitation, 
and living independently without a partner before moving into a couple relationship both constitute 
this type of stage. Cohabitation can thus be seen as just one component of many, in a process 
through which individual behavior is determined less by tradition and institutional arrangements 
and is more open to individual choice (Bernhardt, 2004). 
It has been argued that those couples who live together desire something fundamentally 
different in a couple relationships than do those who are married. Cohabiting adults may demand 
more personal autonomy, more gender equity, and greater flexibility; they may have chosen 
cohabitation in order to avoid a more binding commitment. However, these desires are likely to 
change over the life course. Cohabiting couples in Sweden tend to marry at a stage in their life 
course connected to a preference for a stable union. According to Bernhardt this stage is usually 
reached after less than five years of having lived together and after having become a parent.  
However, in the USA as well as in the most post-socialist countries non-marital 
childbearing is more associated with a pattern of disadvantage experienced by single mothers and 
low-income minority populations (particularly in the USA) (Wu and Wolfe, 2001). At the same 
time by opinion of some researchers women have preferred to be alone instead of having unstable 
partner.  
It seemed that along with the decreasing in the value of total fertility rate the number of live 
births born out-of-wedlock increased, but recent trends in extramarital live births did not prove this 
hypothesis (Figure 17).  
Live births to unmarried women rose substantially in recent decades. In 1970 the 
overwhelming majority of US children were born to married couples (Figure 17). In 1990s one in 
every three US live births occurred outside of marriage, whereas one seconds of all Swedish 
children born out-of-wedlock. This increase in childbearing outside of marriage – non-marital 
childbearing – has been under way at least since the 1940s. After very large increases in the 1970s 
and 1980s, non-marital childbearing rates peaked in the first half of the 1990s.  
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The increased availability of contraception and abortion made shotgun weddings18 a thing 
of the past. Women who were willing to get an induced abortion or who reliably used contraception 
no longer found it necessary to condition sexual rel tions on a promise of marriage in the event of 
pregnancy. Another reason is that women who wanted chil ren, who did not want an abortion for 
moral or religious reasons, or who were unreliable in their use of contraception found themselves 
pressured to participate in premarital sexual relations without being able to exact a promise of 
marriage in case of pregnancy. These women feared, correctly, that if they refused sexual relations, 
they would risk losing their partners. Sexual activity without commitment was increasingly 
expected in premarital relationships (Akerlof, 2010). 

































































 55%  55%
 
  Source: www.eurostat.eu; www.coe.int; www.cdc.gov; www.coe.int 
  Note: Along with the percentage of extramarital live births the value of TFR in the figure are 
  shown  
The selected post-socialist countries experienced a r m rkable demographic transformation 
in the past twenty years. On many dimensions of fertility and family formation, many of the post-
socialist countries now follow the trends observed in Western Europe: rising age at first marriage 
and first birth, and high and increasing numbers of extramarital live births. 
As shown in Figure 18, the share of extramarital live births increased across the post-
socialist countries beginning in the early-to the end-1990s; the highest share was in Latvia (nearly 
40 percent of all live births) which rivals the out-of-wedlock birth rates of Scandinavian countries 
like Sweden (55%). The contribution of extramarital live births to changes in overall fertility varies 
across countries: in most countries an increase in the share of extramarital live births accounted for 
the large drop in overall fertility rates in the 1990s due to the fact that the decrease of marital 
                                                
18 Shotgun wedding is a wedding forced because of unplan ed pregnancy 
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fertility was not compensated by sufficiently large numbers of extramarital live births (Table 12, 
13). 
  Figure 18: Development of extramarital live births in selected post-socialist 
































































  Source: www.eurostat.eu, www.data.euro.who.int/hfadb/, www.unicef.org, www.gks.ru 
  Note: Along with the percentage of extramarital live births the value of TFR in the figure are 
  shown  
Most of the changes in the patterns of fertility and family formation described above 
represent a potential improvement in the welfare of children in post-socialist countries. Later 
marriage and childbearing may result in parents whoare better prepared, financially and otherwise, 
to raise a family; the increase in the use of modern contraception leads to better timing of childbirth 
and possibly fewer ‘unwanted’ children. The increase in out-of-wedlock live births might be seen 
as a negative trend, but even this may not be highly detrimental if the increase in extramarital live 
births reflects a shift from registered marriage to cohabitation rather than an increase in single 
parenthood (Brainerd, 2010). 
Table 12 – Difference in total, marital and extramarital live births: USA and 
Sweden, 1960 - 2005 
1960 2005 Difference 1960 2005 Difference
Total live births 4257850 4138349 -119501 102219 101346 -873
Marital live births 4033550 2611315 -1422235 90684 45154 -45530
Extramarital live births 224300 1527034 1302734 11535 56192 44657
USA Sweden
 
Source: UN Demographic Yearbook; www.cdc.gov; www.eurostat.eu 
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 Table 13 – Difference in total, marital and extramarital live births: selected post-socialist countries, 
 1990 - 2005 
1990 2005 Difference 1990 2005 Difference 1990 2005 Difference 1990 2005 Difference
Total live birthss 130564 102211 -28353 363335 278977 -84358 1988858 1457400 -531458 37918 21497 -16421
Marital live births 119397 69802 -49595 315375 210922 -104453 1698485 1020318 -678167 31517 11916 -19601
Extramarital live births 11167 32409 21242 47960 68055 20095 290373 437082 146709 6401 9581 3180
Czech Republic Kazakhstan Russian Federation Latvia
 
 Source: UN Demographic Yearbook; www.eurostat.eu; www.transmonee.org 
Non-marital childbearing is quite often associated with economic deprivation or with a 
changing social position. Therefore non-marital childbearing in Northern Europe, particularly in 
Sweden, signifies a rejection of traditional institutions and increase in independence and autonomy 
while non-marital childbearing in the US and post-socialist countries is associated with 
socioeconomic hardship and obstacles to marriage (Perelli-Harris, 2010) However, with the 
improvement of socio-economic conditions in post-socialist countries the part of the extramarital 
live births can be due to increasing popularity of c habited couples. 





























Sweden Latvia USA Russia Kazakhstan Czech Republic
 
  Source: www.humanfertility.org; www.eurostat.eu; Kazakhstan State Statistic Agency: 
  unpublished data 
There are large differences across selected countries in the proportion of children born 
outside of marriage: this proportion varies from 21% (the Czech Republic) to 55% (Sweden) in 
1999 and from 21% (Kazakhstan) to 55% (Sweden) in 2007 (Figure 19). From the beginning to the 
middle of analyzed period the most of selected countries increased the number of parents who were 
not married at the time of birth of their children. However, very recent trends in extramarital live 
births diverged. Kazakhstan reduced the proportion of extramarital live births from 24% in 1999 to 
21% in 2007 as well as Russia and Latvia which experienced slight decrease from the middle of the 
analyzed period. At the same time the percentage of live births born out-of-wedlock in Russia 
remained at the same level in 2007 (28%) as it was in 1999 (28%). Whereas the number of children 
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born outside of marriage in US and the Czech Republic increased from 33% and 21% in 1999 to 
40% and 34% in 2007 respectively. During the studied p riod Sweden displayed stagnation in the 
development of extramarital live births. 
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Source: www.eurostat.eu; www.humanfertility.org; Kazakhstan State Statistic Agency: unpublished data 
Figure 20 illustrates the relationship between the s are of live births outside marriage and 
the total fertility rate. As it was previously mentioned the trends in total fertility rate in all selected 
countries were developed towards increasing. However the trends occurred in the past were much 
different compared to the trends of the analyzed period. When comparing the levels of TFR and the 
percentages of extramarital live births within the same double scaling (one for TFR, another for the 
percentage of extramarital live births), three types of developments can be identify (Figure 20): 
a) the percentage of extramarital live births is higher than TFR (Sweden, Latvia); b) the percentage 
of extramarital live births is lower than TFR (USA, Kazakhstan); c) the percentage of extramarital 
live births is relatively the same as TFR (Russia, Czech Republic). Therefore, we can suggest a new 
country typology which is not based on absolute levels but on a relationship between a fertility 
level and an intensity of extramarital childbearing. Sweden and Latvia are countries with relatively 
high extramarital childbearing while USA and Kazakhstan represent lower intensity of extramarital 
childbearing, finally Russia and the Czech Republic can be labeled as countries with adequate level 
of extramarital childbearing. 
Sweden as a forerunner in the share of extramarital fertility increased that value gradually, 
whereas the Czech Republic has experienced an increase in the share of extramarital live births 
relatively in a short period.  
Moreover, the increase in the value of TFR in Sweden, Russia and Kazakhstan occurred 
irrespectively on the development in the share of extramarital live births. Sweden displayed the 
increase in the value of total fertility rate from 1.5 in 1999 to 1.9 in 2007, whereas the share of live 
births outside marriage did not change considerably, which was about 55% during the studied 
period. At the same time, the value of total fertility rate in Russia increased from 1.2 in 1999 to 1.4 
in 2007. However the share of extramarital live births in Russia developed with some changes, 
where the highest value observed in 2005 (30%), but in the end of the studied period (2007) it was 
at the same level (28%) as it was in the beginning of the period (1999). Kazakhstan was the sole 
country among all selected countries that dropped its share of live births outside marriage from 
24% in 1999 to 21% in 2007, while the value of total fertility rate increased from 1.8 to 2.5 in the 
same period.  
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2.3.2 Decomposition in the difference of TFR 
The change in the value of TFR can be related to the change in age structure of women by marital 
status and to the change in marital or non-marital fertility. The decomposition techniques will show 
the impact of changing in age structure of women by marital status, marital or non-marital fertility.  
The decomposition method (p.32) used to identify the difference in the value of total 
fertility rate between 1970 and 2005 in Sweden, 1985 and 2005 in the Czech Republic gave the 
following findings (Table 14). Fertility decline in Europe started from the Scandinavian countries. 
In our case Sweden represents the Scandinavian country as well as western country, while the 
Czech Republic represents the post-socialist country. Taking into consideration that decline in the 
value of TFR in Sweden started earlier than in the Cz ch Republic, the proper period was taken. 
In 1970 the Swedish level of total fertility rate was 1.9 where the share of extramarital live 
births accounted less than 20%. However in 2005 the children born out-of-wedlock were more than 
50% of all live births, whereas the value of total fertility rate accounted 1.8. The value of TFR 
between 1970 and 2005 in Sweden declined by -0.17. The change in the value of TFR was 
predominantly due to the change in age structure of women by marital status. The change in marital 
structure (-0.81) was moderated by the increase in intensity of marital (+0.46) and non-marital 
(+0.18) fertility. If the age structure of women bymarital status observed in 1970 would remain in 
2005 the increase in the value of TFR in 2005 would be 0.64 (= 0.46+0.18) (Table 14).  
The Czech Republic before the collapse of state socialist regime experienced the total 
fertility rate at the level of 1.9 in 1985 with more than 7% of extramarital live births, while after he 
collapse of socialism and twenty years as an independent state in 2005 the total fertility rate was 1.3 
and share of children born out-of-wedlock reached more than 30%.The decrease in the value of 
TFR was more pronounced here than in Sweden and amounted to -0.66. The drop in TFR was 
primarily due to the change in age structure of women by marital status (-0.95). Similarly to 
Sweden, if the structure of women by marital status ob erved in 1985 would remain in 2005 the 
value of TFR would be increased by 0.28 (= 0.19+0.09). 
 Table 14 – Decomposition of total fertility rate in Sweden (between 1970 and 2005) and the Czech 
 Republic (1985 and 2005) 
Difference in % Difference in %
Total effect of structure according the marital status -0.81 477 -0.95 143
Total effect of marital fertility 0.46 -269 0.19 -29
Total effect of non-marital fertility 0.18 -108 0.09 -14
Total -0.17 100 -0.66 100
Sweden (1970 - 2005) Czech Republic (1985 - 2005)
 Source: Author’s calculations based on data www.ssd.scb.se, www.szso.cz 
2.3.3 Age profiles of extramarital childbearing  
Non-marital live births vary considerably by age. Usually, the high proportion of extramarital live 
births is among young women.  
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  Figure 21 – Proportion of extramarital live births in total live births according to 
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  Source: www.humanfertility.org; www.eurostat.eu; Kazakhstan State Statistic Agency: 
  unpublished data 
However Figure 21 features the share of extramarital live births in total live births 
according to age groups. Women aged 15 – 19 displayed the highest share of live births outside 
marriage in all selected countries. The share of live births outside marriage among women in the 
age group 15 – 19 was more than 70% of all live births in the most of selected countries. However 
Russian and Kazakh women in this age group experienced that share less than 50%. As in older 
ages women as considerably the proportion of live brths outside marriage decreased. On the other 
hand, as women getting older the share of extramarital live births in that ages slightly increased. 
Women from all selected countries displayed the higher share of live births outside marriage in the 
age group 40 – 44 than in the 35 – 39 ages. Whereas th  hare of extramarital live births among 
Kazakh women in the groups 35 – 39 and 40 – 44 was at the same level (20%). However women 
aged 45 – 49 in Latvia and Kazakhstan experienced th  higher share of live births outside marriage 
(44% and 24% respectively) than women in younger ags 40 – 44 (36% and 20% respectively). 
Whereas Sweden and Russia displayed the same level in both age groups (51% and 34% 
respectively).  
As a consequence there are three situations in older ages: 2 countries – slightly increased 
(Latvia and Kazakhstan); 2 countries with stagnation (Sweden and Russia); 2 countries – slightly 
decreased (Czech Republic and USA).  
According to Figure 22 in 2006 the highest proportion of extramarital live births in post-
socialist countries was observed in the age group 20 – 4, where it varied from 8% (Kazakhstan, 
Sweden and the Czech Republic) to 15% (Latvia). Their counterparts in the USA experienced the 
same pattern with 15% of extramarital live births in this age group. The sole exception regarding 
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the maximum percentage of extramarital live births among post-socialist countries was the Czech 
Republic that displayed the highest share of extrama ital live births among women aged 25 – 29 
(11%). At the same time Swedish women aged 25 – 29 and 30 – 34 experienced the highest share 
of extramarital live births (17% and 19% respectively).  
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  Source: www.humanfertility.org; www.eurostat.eu; Kazakhstan State Statistic Agency: 
  unpublished data 
As Table 15 shows in 2006 the mean age of unmarried mothers across the countries at the 
time of their child birth varied from 25 to 30 years old. The mean age of mothers among married 
varied from 28 to 31 years old. The youngest mothers among selected countries who were out-of-
wedlock at the time of their child birth were among US and Russian women (24.6 and 25.9). 
Whereas the mean age of married mothers at childbirth in those countries were 28.9 and 29.9 
respectively. Swedish and Czech unmarried women displayed the older mean age (29.9 and 27.3 
respectively), while the mean age of married mothers were 31.4 and 29.7. Kazakh mothers were in 
the middle among all mothers in selected countries. The mean age of unmarried mothers was 26.9, 
married – 28.2. 
  Table 15 – Mean age of mothers at childbearing according to marital status in 200619  
Sweden Czech Republic Kazakstan Latvia Russia USA
Unmarried 29.9 27.3 26.9 26.3 25.9 24.6
Married 31.4 29.7 28.2 28.9 26.8 29.9
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from www.humanfertility.org, www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan State Statistic 
Agency: unpublished data 
                                                
19 Computed from the distribution of rates of the 2nd kind 
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Finally, according to Carmen Solomon-Fears specialist in Social policy domestic social 
policy division in the USA factors that have contributed to an unprecedented level of non-marital 
childbearing include the followings: 
an increase in the mean age of first marriage; 
delays in childbearing of married couples; 
increased marital dissolution; 
an increase in the number of cohabiting couples; 
increased sexual activity outside of marriage; 
participation in risky behaviors that often lead to sex; 
improper use of contraceptive methods; 
lack of marriageable partners. 
In the most post-socialist countries the increase in the percentage of live births out-of-
wedlock resulted not so much from changes in the conception behavior neither of cohabiters, nor 
from changes in union formation behavior after conception, as from the increasing proportion of 
women who cohabit before conception. More women are now exposed to the risk of conceiving 
within cohabitation, but once they conceive, they are s just likely as before to marry. Thus, the 
increase in births within cohabitation is part and parcel of the “retreat” from marriage in the most 
post-socialist countries (Gerber and Berman forthcoming, Hoem et al 2009). The relationship 
between education and non-marital childbearing has not changed over time: the least educated 
women have the highest birth rates as cohabiting or single mothers, due to their rates of marriage 
prior to conception and their lower probabilities of legitimating a non-marital conception. Thus, the 
least educated women are at the greatest disadvantage when it comes to marriage after conception. 
This is not because they are rejecting the institution of marriage in favor of autonomy, but it could 
be rather because they or their partners are “unsuitable” for marriage, either due to lack of 
employment opportunities or other unfavorable characteristics (Edin and Kefalis 2005; Gibson-
Davis et al 2005). The collapse of the state socialist regime in the post-socialist countries, which led
to increases in economic instability, poverty, and anomie would have increased the number of 
women in this situation (Perelli-Harris, 2010).  
The pattern of disadvantage implies a divergence in family formation strategies based on 
socio-economic status. Marriage remains an indicator of the greater opportunities and stability 
associated with higher education. This pattern seem to have been exacerbated by the economic 
turmoil during transition of post-socialist countries to a market economy. Now, as inequality 
increases in Russia, family behaviors will most likely continue to diverge along two trajectories 
similar to those McLanahan (2004) described in the U.S.: ”One trajectory – the one associated with 
delays in childbearing and increases in maternal employment – reflects gains in resources, while the 
other – the one associated with divorce and non-marital childbearing – reflects losses” (Perelli-
Harris, 2010).  
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2.4 Current country grouping based on main fertilit y parameters  
According to the analysis of fertility development i  selected western and the post-socialist 
countries is obviously seen that each country experienced its own type of fertility trend and 
currently show country specific pattern. However, in 2005 the difference in indicators of period 
fertility in selected countries was not such as significant as it observed in the beginning (Table 16).  






Mean age          at 
1st childbirth
Kazakhstan 2.2 11 24 24.4
USA 2.1 20 37 25.7
Sweden 1.8 19 55 28.7
Czech Republic 1.3 38 32 26.6
Latvia 1.3 33 45 24.9
Russia 1.3 27 30 24.1  
   Source: www.humanfertility.org, www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan State Statistic Agency: 
   unpublished data 
A hierarchical cluster analysis (based on Euclidean distance and Ward grouping) performed 
on main indicators of period fertility (listed in the table, transformed in z-scores) in selected 
countries clearly illustrates how the countries are currently divided (Figure 23).  
According to Figure 23 the main convergence in period fertility indicators is observed 
among Kazakh and US women, as well as among Czech, Latvian and Russian women. While 
fertility patterns of Swedish women was more different from the other selected countries. Thus, 
there are two groups and one country apart. 
First group is represented by Kazakhstan and the USA; the Czech Republic, Latvia and 
Russia represent the second group. Sweden is an apart country that represents a unique type of 
fertility development.   
The similarities in period fertility indicators among Kazakh and US women observed in 
2005 are due to the trends in fertility patterns from the World War II in the USA and from the 
collapse of socialist regime in Kazakhstan. Kazakh women experienced high fertility level before 
the collapse of socialist regime. During the transformation period occurred in the 1990s, it dropped 
the value of total fertility level below replacement level. However, along with the improvement in 
socio-economic conditions for childbearing in the country fertility level of Kazakh women 
increased significantly reaching the above replacement level of TFR. While US women 
experienced the first signs of the Second Demographic Transition earlier than Kazakh women. The 
value in total fertility rate in the USA slightly increased since the mid-1990s. However, in spite of 
difference in socio-economic conditions the indicators on period fertility among Kazakh and US 
women are much similar. This is mostly due to the high level in total fertility rate and the 
similarities in fertility age profile of Kazakh and US women as well as in multiethnic composition 
of the population.  
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Figure 23 – Dendograms resulting from main indicators of period fertility in selected countries, 2005 
 
Source: www.humanfertility.org, www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan State Statistic Agency: unpublished data 
The main convergence of indicators in period fertility in the second group represented by 
post-socialist countries of the Czech Republic, Latvia and Russia is a matter of trends in fertility 
development from the collapse of socialist regime. The socio-economic factors including economic 
crisis and later changes in the value of cultural norms occurred in most countries of post-socialist 
regime impinged on childbearing decisions. However, improvement in socio-economic conditions 
did not significantly increase fertility level of women in these countries. The high proportion of 
childless women, increased the mean age at 1st childbirth and therefore the low fertility level of
TFR are the main indicators that combined these countries into one group.  
At the same time, Sweden represents a unique type of f rtility development. Swedish 
society is among the first that experienced the first signs of the Second Demographic Transition. 
However, decline in fertility level after the baby-oom period was replaced by slight increase in the 
value of TFR in the 1990s. Modern family policy in Sweden and the egalitarian form in child care 
allowed to couples to give a more births compared with the most European countries including the 
Eastern and Central European post-socialist countries 
Up to now we observed the differences in indicators of period fertility among two groups 
and one country apart. These differences are due to the various types of fertility development in 
selected countries. Table 17 (a, b) displays how the average values of indicators in period fertility 
differed by first and second group. The differences in the values of TFR and the proportion of 
childless women were much significant than in the proportion of extramarital live births and the 
mean age at 1st child birth. 
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 Table 17 – Average values in indicators of period fertility: selected countries, 2005  












2.1 15 31 25.0
 













1.3 33 36 25.2
 






Mean age          at 
1st childbirth
Sweden 1.8 19 55 28.7
 
  Source: www.humanfertility.org, www.eurostat.eu, Kazakhstan State Statistic Agency: unpublished data 
Finally, selected countries represent different ferility patterns. However by 2005, two 
groups of countries were combined by their similarit es in the indicators of period fertility and one 
country was defined as a unique. As a result, fertility patterns in selected countries analyzed in the 
research represent the different types of fertility behavior among two groups of countries and one 
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Each of selected countries has its own distinctive history, culture, and contemporary economic, 
political and social circumstances impacted on fertility development. The western countries of the 
USA and Sweden as a the most developed countries experi nced the Second Demographic 
Transition from high to low levels of fertility earlier than the post-socialist countries. Over the past 
quarter century massive changes in fertility behavior have occurred in western developed countries 
of Sweden and the US reaching the level of TFR below replacement level. These changes in 
fertility patterns have been accompanied by changes in socio-economic conditions and cultural 
values in the society. Thus following the patterns of demographic and social characteristics of the 
Second Demographic Transition presented by Lesthaeghe. The post-socialist countries are 
characterized by the common economic reforms shifted economies from the state-administered to 
market-base systems experienced severe economic crisis in the immediate aftermath of reforms, 
though the duration and severity of these crises varied. Political reforms eliminated one-party rule 
and strict limitations on civil liberties, implementing in their place some form of democracy and 
protections of individual freedoms, though elements of authoritarian control remain present 
(Gerber, 2009). With the end of rather extensive restrictions on the capacity to free exchange 
cultural artifacts, ideas and images, the societies of the post-socialist countries all opened up. As a 
consequence all post-socialist countries experienced a common set of dramatic, rapid, and 
unprecedented changes in demographic development, especially in fertility patterns.  
All countries of selected post-socialist countries di played substantial declines in their 
values of TFR during the 1990s. The decline was steepest even in Kazakhstan with initially higher 
fertility rates observed before the collapse of state socialist regime. The level of TFR in post-
socialist countries stabilized with the improvement of economic and financial characteristics of the 
country. Moreover, post-socialist countries increased their values of TFR in recent years of 
analyzed period as well as the US and Sweden.  
Fertility decline observed in selected countries can reflect delays in childbearing. The mean 
age at first birth compared with the recent decade increased in all selected countries by different 
speed. High mean age at first birth was peculiarity of western countries. However due to socio-
economic transformation of post socialist countries thi  pattern occurred even there. However, early 
age at childbearing was on of the most distinctive features of Eastern European reproductive 
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behavior. At the same time due to the shift towards later childbearing, fertility decline did not affect 
all age groups of equally (Sobotka, 2002).  
According to the results of coefficient correlation method used to identify the dependency 
of the value of TFR on ratio the correlation between the variable of Ratio (ASFR(-29)/ASFR(30+)) 
and total fertility rate have been weakening year to year in analyzed period. At the same time, the 
decomposition method used for Sweden and the Czech R public found the high effect of changing 
in age structure of women by marital status on changing overall fertility in those countries. I.e. the 
change in age structure of women and their marital status highly impacted on development of the 
value of TFR.  
During the past few decades profound changes have taken place in selected countries. The 
role of the traditional family has become weaker and new living arrangements have gained 
importance. Behind these demographic trends especially in western societies have been changes in 
behavior and attitudes, which might be characterized as a declining motivation for parenthood and a 
growing search for individual status (Keilman, 1987).  
Along with the improvement of socio-economic conditions the utility of children is low, i.e. 
the value of children has experienced transformation towards individual interests and motivations 
(education, career growth and etc.). Average size of the families in selected countries dropped from 
long perspective. However, the number of children in the families during the analyzed period 
relatively increased. At the same time the assumption on utility of children has become less 
presented above fails to explain why in large families (with more than 3 children) borne such 
amount of children under circumstances of low economic utility (e.g., in high-income families). In 
our case western developed countries of the USA and Sweden as well as former Soviet country of 
Kazakhstan displayed the higher share of large families than the other post-socialist countries. 
Thus, not only economic utility of children does play an important role, but also psychological and 
social values do20. 
Another striking development in the post-socialist countries as well as in western countries 
over the past decades is the sharp rise of extramarit l live births as a percentage of total live births. 
The sharp increase in children born out-of-wedlock started in western countries after the baby-
boom period. Cohabitation played an important role in increasing the number of non-marital live 
births, it is much spread in Sweden. However, in the USA as well as in selected post-socialist 
countries the increase in the percentage of live births born out-of-wedlock resulted from 
childbearing of single mothers. Women in those countries preferred to stay alone instead to have 
unsuitable (non stable) partner. On the other hand, the popularity of cohabitation among US and 
post-socialist countries young people has grown dramatically in recent decades. Today, even 
children born outside of marriage are important for the nations. Therefore, to support single 
                                                
20 Psychological values referred to the happiness, joy, and companionship or to the discomfort and stres which parents 
expect to experience with having a child. Social values referred to the expected social advantages or disadvantages of 
having children (e.g., social approval and social st tu  when a married couple has a child; continuation of the family line 
as in the case of having a son as in patrilineal societies) (Sam, 2001) 
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mothers or pregnant women without official partner on behalf of government are crucial for further 
increasing and stabilizing fertility rate in the countries with low level of fertility development.  
That is why the measures have taken in selected countries for the women giving a birth and 
families with children are aimed to manage the demographic changes observed today. Each of 
selected countries presented a unique way of development of its family policy. However they have 
common similarities and dissimilarities. According to Gauthier groups of country distinguished by 
development of family policy, we assume that all seect d post-socialist countries belong to pro-
family but non-interventionist model: for which responsibility to support families is taken by 
government only for families in need. On the other and these countries are improving the social 
and financial support for the families with children. Except, Latvia that cut financial budget to the 
social needs due to the world economic crisis in the end of 2000s, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the 
Czech Republic and Russian Federation might be partially related to pro-family/pro-natalist model. 
The USA is more characterized as pro-traditional model: for which the preservation of the family is 
the main concern where Governments partly endorse the responsibility of supporting families. 
However, Swedish family policy is related to pro-egalitarian model: for which the promotion of 
greater equality between men and women is the main objective. In the countries with such model 
governments take full responsibility in the support f families, especially working parents. This 
model stands in sharp contrast with the previous one.
Families in selected countries are changing and because of this family policy concerns 
change. Encouraging and stimulating women to give a birth by social and financial support are 
important. Additionally, the government and society have to advocate and popularize the traditional 
values concerning families and children importance i  their life and country’s development. If any 
measures the governments take than the demographic changes including fertility development 
might be affected negatively very much on further dvelopment of the nation.  
The cluster analysis has shown that selected countries displayed similarities and 
dissimilarities in period fertility indicators in 2005. As a result Kazakhstan and the USA are 
combined into one group (first group), while the Czech Republic, Latvia and Russia defined as the 
second group of countries and only Sweden – as a country apart.  
Despite of different socio-economic background, Kazakh and US women experienced very 
similar period fertility indicators in 2005. The repr sentatives of the second group the Czech 
Republic, Latvia and Russia shared the same history after the collapse of state socialist regime in 
the countries. In spite the fact, that the Czech Republic experienced the features of the first 
demographic transition (as well as most western counties) earlier than Latvia and Russia, it 
displayed very similar period fertility indicators with these post-socialist countries. Sweden as a 
country apart represents a unique type in the patterns of period fertility indicators that displayed the 
features of the Second Demographic Transition among the firsts in Europe. 
Finally, according to the results, fertility patterns occurred in selected countries are 
comparable with each other. Moreover, it shows that fertility behavior could be similar despite the 
different background in socio-economic conditions ad demographic development.  
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